THIS IS, AND IS NOT, SHAKESPEARE:
(IN)FIDELITY IN ADAPTATION

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THIS IS, AND IS NOT, SHAKESPEARE: (IN)FIDELITY IN ADAPTATION

by MARK CHARLES FORTIER

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with the theory and practice of recent theatrical adaptations of Shakespeare.

Part one, a theoretical introduction, follows three simultaneous arguments. First, existing definitions and categorizations of adaptation are inadequate, positing unfounded generalizations and traditional valorization of originality—an originality which is always already in part an adaptation—in the place of necessarily absent absolute criteria for analysis and judgement. Second, any attempt to return to Shakespeare’s intention, or to Shakespeare’s plays "in Shakespeare’s playhouse," as grounds for fidelity in interpretation should recognize how incompletely such grounds can ever be known or reconstructed. Third, adaptation is best understood not through a strict definition which would set it off once and for all as a distinct object, but in its interplay with similar cultural activities of rewriting or recontextualization: intertextuality, citation, translation, parody. An emphasis is placed upon the political potential of these activities, especially their potential to disrupt hegemonic notions of genre, author, and canon.

Part two analyses a small group of recent Shakespearean adaptations: Carmelo Bene’s Richard III, Heiner Müller’s
Hamletmachine, and Herbert Blau's--or KRAKEN's--Elsinore and Crooked Eclipses. These works are analyzed under three headings: theory and practice, especially the interplay of verbal theory and nonverbal theatrical practice; intertextuality, or the use that is made of Shakespeare and other intertexts; context, both the sociopolitical context in which these works arise and the effect these works purport to have upon their context and their audience. Part two ends with discussions of René-Daniel Dubois' Pericles, and Ann-Marie MacDonald's Goodnight Desdemona, two Canadian works which take up the rewriting and recontextualization of Shakespearean romance.

Informed by the contemporary theory and practice examined in parts one and two, part three, by way of (in)conclusion, continues this work on romance through a provisional study or adaptation of The Winter's Tale.
Acknowledgements

This is for Char and Jules.
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Part one:  
an introduction for 3 voices

"captive nuts"  
"Radical Interpretation"

In order to grasp and mark out my topic I have used the term adaptation. This raises the question, "What do I mean by adaptation?" or "what is (not) an adaptation?" It is in answering this question, or in answering to its unansweredness, that I

I am sitting with a copy of Dover Wilson's facsimile of the first folio text of Henry V (or more specifically of a copy of the first folio in the British Museum, (G. 11631)). As to this text, Wilson says "everything about it suggests that the copy from which it was printed was

"the law of Writ, and the Liberty"

In (the) place of a definition of adaptation, or placed as its underpinning, a *basso continuo*, there is a set of affinities to be developed and explored. Rather than set adaptation or an adaptation apart, as an inside to an excluded outside of everything which is simply not (an) adaptation, I want to see how adaptation relates to other marginal concepts or activities, how it shares a structure
must position myself within either Shakespeare's own manuscript or a transcript taken directly from it." In other words, this is a reliable text. The transcriber (?) interferes only at two points, misplacing a line of Exeter's on 86b (The Riverside Shakespeare goes for a fuller transposition of these lines (4.3.13-14) "suggested by Thirlby" (974)), and misreading "a'babbled [or "babled"] of

with these concepts and activities, a subordinated/subversive relationship to certain hegemonic concepts or activities, how it is different from the concepts and activities to which it holds affinities, how it enters into a system of relations with those concepts and activities, paradoxical relations of definition whereby each can be seen as either a part of any of the others or the whole of which each of the others is a part (in other words, each claims to be the name not only of the excluded and marginalized, but, in an
and permutation that characterize (the process of) adaptation; that the complexity of adaptation will inevitably confound simple attempts at definition; that the attempt to categorize adaptation by rules of genre runs up against the subversive quality of adaptation: that attempts to evaluate green fields" in Shakespeare's foul papers as "a Table of greene fields" (75b), the correct reading having been restored or reconstructed by "the brilliant guess [(re)interpretation?] made by Theobald in 1726," a guess ensconced in The Riverside Shakespeare as well (2.3.16-17).

The Riverside account of the origins of the Folio text unrestricted sense, of the arché which is not an origin).

This exploration sets loose any number of questions. Are translation, citation, and parody subsets of adaptation? Are the death of the author and the law of genre part of what André Lefevere calls "rewriting, in all its forms"? Can Deleuze and Guattari's "minor literature" function as an adequate umbrella term? Or would it be better to forget our umbrella? Can one of the set be made the original or source for the others? If not, how are they to be related in their
adaptation, either as true or false to the original, or as better or worse than the original, are based on naive and simplistic notions, and are also implicitly—just like the attempt to categorize (as opposed to a more open or wild analysis)—attempts to contain and defuse adaptation in the name of a (literary and theatrical) status quo. is, however, somewhat different than Wilson's. Reference is made to a suspect argument by Cairncross that the text "was in fact set up from copy composed of pages of 02 and 03 corrected and augmented by reference to the 'foul papers'" (972). This is dubious (Gary Taylor systematically refutes Cairncross in Wells and Taylor, 41-71), but "That there is some kind of specific differences? How can a general theory of the set lead to an illumination of a specific practice? How can an illumination of specific practices lead to a general theory? As prologue, here is a citation, fragmented and out of (original [?]) context, from Derrida:

it would be necessary to analyze very closely the experience of hearing someone else read a text you have originally written or signed. All of a sudden someone puts a text right in front of you
[Here is Ray Conlogue reviewing Heiner Müller's Quartet:

Muller's [sic] writing has been highly praised for its honesty and freedom from illusion. But it is equally possible to see him as a literary parasite who attaches himself to masterpieces of the past bibliographical link between Q3, at least, and the F1 text seems nearly certain." Q3 is based on Q1, a "'bad'' quarto, a memorial reconstruction, which "has nothing more than what might be called 'hearsay' authority" (971); Q3, however, for some unknown reason, contains a number of "slight variations." As to the foul papers which are said to lie behind the F1 text, there is again in another context, with an intention that is both somewhat yours and not simply yours. Each time it happens, it's a very curious, very troubling experience. I can't analyze it here. What I can say is it is never the same text, never an echo, that comes back to you. It can be a very pleasant experience. It can reconcile you with what you've done, make you love it or hate it. There are a thousand possibilities. Yet one thing
--major (like Hamlet) or minor (like La Clos' book)—and reduces them to husks.

Definition as classification (major/minor; masterpiece/parasite) and literary/theatrical politics are inextricably intertwined.

I want to begin by looking at Ruby Cohn's Modern Shakespeare Off-

"some evidence of revision" from what "Shakespeare originally intended" (972).

[The 24th Annual Conference on Editorial Problems, held at the University of Toronto, November 4-5, 1988, featured several of the foremost names in the editing of Renaissance texts (Nicolas Barker, Gary Taylor, Stephen Orgel) arguing for the acceptance of undecidability as an editorial principle.

is certain in all this diversity, and that is that it is never the same. What is more, even before someone cites it or reads it to you, as in the present situation, the text's identity has been lost, and it's no longer the same as soon as it takes off, as soon as it has begun, as soon as it's on the page [these words were first spoken aloud, at a symposium in Montreal, taped, then transcribed, printed and published]...Perhaps the
shoots. Here is the first paragraph of her first chapter:

Rewriting of Shakespeare is known by an array of names--abridgements, adaptations, additions, alterations, ameliorations, amplifications, augmentations, conversions, distortions, emendations, that Shakespeare really wrote or meant may never have existed. As a complication in the present case, Barker argued that foul papers were never used in the preparation of printed texts, that someone's fair copy always intervened desire to write is the desire to launch things that come back to you as much as possible in as many forms as possible. That is, it is the desire to perfect a program or a matrix having the greatest potential, variability, undecidability, plurivocality, et cetera, so that each time something returns it will be as different as possible. (The Ear of the Other, 157-158)

To cite myself: first from the 'original' (second
interpolations, between the author's manuscript and the printed page.
metamorphoses, modifications, mutilations, revisions, transformations, versions. In contrast, I use a looser and more neutral word, "offshoot," but I should like to indicate how far the shoots grow from the Shakespearean stem.

This is not an essay on textual reconstruction, at least not in a traditional sense. If I begin by pointing out the status of the F1 text--a facsimile of a printing of a transcription of revised foul papers in conjunction somehow with a revised third printing of a bad quarto--it is only to point out that in using this draft) proposal for this dissertation; then from a letter I wrote in response to questions from the Graduate Study Committee:

All life is an adaptation, and so all cultural life, and so all literary (or theatrical activity)--this is adaptation in the broad sense. In the narrow sense, literary (or theatrical) adaptation is a privileged place to study the issues arising out of this general principle of
(And that stem itself is problematical, since eighteen Shakespeare plays exist in Quarto versions of varying quality, as well as in the more carefully edited First Folio of 1623.) (3)

There are several issues in this categorization which need to be addressed. First, the stress on text I willfully take up a text which is not an original. It is an adaptation; it is rooted in a historical context. As Maurice Evans argues, it reveals, in a way that homogenized, scholarly editions of Shakespeare’s works do not (Hinman’s reconstruction of the first Folio, taking pages from various copies to create an ideal copy which has never existed, is another scholarly adaptation;)

Any definition of adaptation which was broad enough would be simplistic and unenlightening (everything is an adaptation); any definition which set arbitrary limits would be open to easy confounding (something which could be considered an adaptation is disqualified)...what I must start to map out is a deconstruction of the notion of
adaptation as a "rewriting" of Shakespeare's texts as they problematically appear in the Quartos and First Folio (a problem which Cohn does not feel the need to address anywhere else or in greater detail), must be set against a broader view of Shakespeare's plays as theatrical and performance text. Cohn is not necessarily unaware of this distinction, although she

adaptation...the binary opposition between true reproduction (a return to the origin, a fidelity to the source) and adaptation (a loss of origin, an infidelity to the source) is premised upon an archeadaptation, a slippage, where the oppositions are not destroyed, but put into (inter)play...a specific adaptation is the site of an interplay among reproduction, adaptation, and arche-slip-page, and the specific articulation of this

ahistoricization), a problematics of interpretation: for us, this is an alien text from a distant time in history (50ff). But for the nonce there is something else about this reconstruction of a text which is important. When Saussure's disciples 'reconstructed' his thought [?] from various sources and fabricated the Course in General Linguistics, one of the things they did was to
sometimes blurs it. In her "Foreword" she writes, My main concern, however, is theater offshoots. Not merely modern production ideas—Hamlet in modern dress, an all-male As You Like It, a Napoleonic Coriolanus, an Edwardian Merchant—but verbal departures from edit out those qualities—repetitions, overlappings, variant formulations (and untold other aspects)—which were "inevitable in free oral presentation" (xiv), but out of place in print. What I want to do is begin to recon-struct what has been left out of the F1 text of Henry V, those myriad matters of oral presentation, of theatre and history, whose absence in the textual reconstruction is interplay, that is the privileging of one term over the others, or the free play of their differences, constitutes the political and cultural significance of actual adaptations. I move in these passages to a different understanding of adaptation in general: on the one hand, an understanding that "no rigorous definition of anything is ultimately possible" (Spivak 1987, 77)—the left hand column of this introduction is an elaboration of this point vis-à-vis the
Shakespeare's texts, hardly marked. I open my facsimile to the first page of the text. The page number, 69, is contained between two horizontal lines. Though dramatic texts are the substance of my text, Beneath these is an ornament and beneath that the title: I do not hesitate to summarize production details. My analysis focusses on drama, Beneath that are two more lines between which are the words, "Enter Prologue." My but I stray into fiction, essay, and theater. (ix-x) question is, how much has already been left out? What is already missing that a

One could reconstruct from a notion of adaptation; on the other, as a more rigorous elaboration of whatever truth there is in a statement such as "everything is an adaptation," the right hand column elaborates the play of adaptation both in the 'original' and in our reading of it (it is difficult to separate the original from the reading). There is also a developing understanding of specific adaptations and their relation to general adaptation: not a privileged site, but an always particular scene of struggle. Would I add anything now,
these lines a fairly coherent distinction between drama and theatre, but that would be to elide certain difficulties. In what way is it appropriate to say that "theater offshoots" are her main concern if her analysis "focusses on drama" and only strays into theater? How full an appreciation of theatre so downplays what are seen as "merely modern full reconstruction on historical grounds might be interested in? What I want to do is begin to map out the complexity of what has not been reconstructed, what perhaps can never be reconstructed, what makes Shakespeare not our contemporary, what forces us to have always already adapted him. I want to begin to fill in what has been eradicated from the text before we get to its opening.

March 31, 1988? [It is now no longer March 31, 1988.] I have three areas of uneasiness. To elaborate all this under too great an influence of the proper name Derrida is something I would like to avoid—my long citation from Derrida is part of a response to the question, "Is it possible to write on the basis of your work?" (157). This does not mean that Derrida is not extremely important, or even that everything I have to say could not be subjected to a Derridean reading. Theoretically, the study of adaptation
production ideas"? The stress on "verbal departures from Shakespeare's texts," no matter how problematic those texts, and although those texts are "intended for performance in the theater," although that theater is not allowed to constitute part of the text, is the basis of Cohn's eventual definitions of adaptation and transformation.

line, to begin to fill in what was there before a word has been spoken.

Laurence Olivier's film of Henry V begins with a long pan of a model of Shakespeare's London, down the Thames, past the seats of power in the old city, through the liberties, towards and finally into a reconstruction of Shakespeare's Globe (the date of Henry V--generally taken to could be aligned with, or subordinated to, a "general grammatology," (Of Grammatology, 30) which would study, among other notions, under the name of writing--"a general science of writing" (27)--translation (8, 11), text (18), reading (19), teratology (5, 38, 41, 42), the other (39). Derrida writes that "the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work" (24), and that "generalized writing" (55), "archewriting" (56), is not the proper name of the object of the science of grammatology,
The "array of names--abridgments...versions" could have led in several ways. One could possibly expect, for instance, a manic attempt at full and particular categorization, like Polonius's "tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral, scene indivisible, or be 1599--makes it difficult to discern which playhouse we should be talking about, since Shakespeare's company was moving at this time from the Theatre to the Globe, with stops at the Curtain or the Cross Keys Inn (Thomson, 23)). What I want to do here is reconstruct, and reinterpret, that movement--from London and the nation to the playhouse to the playing space to the actor's body.

that writing has been merely, "the most formidable difference," and that difference, renamed différence, would be more "originary," but one would no longer be able to call it "origin" or "ground," those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference. (23)

And so, writes Spivak, "No nomenclature is ideologically pure" (1987, 133).
poem unlimited" (Hamlet 2.2.396-400, as (re)constructed from Quartos 1,3, & 4 and the First Folio by G. Blakemore Evans for The Riverside Shakespeare), which might have led to a confounding and subversion of the attempt to set out genres of adaptation. Also, Cohn's use of alphabetical order for her list, like Roland Barthes' use of alphabetical order in list, like Roland Barthes' use of alphabetical order in alphabetical order for her purpose is manifold: to contribute to a contextuialized semiology of theatre; its reconstruction must be. Its purpose is manifold: to contribute to a contextuialized semiology of theatre;

If I find difference, or even différence, has the look of metaphysical entities, if only as writing, as inscriptions, if I prefer to pluralize the term, and speak of differences, if only in order to make the inscription look as if it evades the unity of a metaphysical concept, then I do so partly in the shadow of a reading of Derrida which is "'unmotivated' but not capricious" (Of Grammatology, 46), or rather arbitrary but not unmotivated. Let us pause at another word. Derrida writes that general grammatology
in *A Lover's Discourse*,
could be seen to stress the
arbitrariness of these
categorizations. But this
is not the strategy that
Cohn chooses to follow.
Instead she gathers this
array under one "more
neutral word, 'offshoot.'"
That Cohn realizes this
word is not neutral but a
biological, organicist
metaphor is immediately
apparent: she "should like
to show what can never be
reconstructed; to show what
can be; to examine the play
of fidelity and infidelity,
the process of adaptation, in
(the reconstruction/reinter-
pretation of) Shakespeare's
'original' performances;
ultimately, to contribute to
a political reutilization of
the reinterpretation and
adaptation of Shakespeare.
To begin our brief survey:
what was this London at the
would not be excluded from linguistics, but would "dominate"
it (44). "To dominate" with its etymology in the long
history of theologico-economic power structures, must be
seen as a symptomatic expression. I do not want Derrida or
grammatology to dominate. I do not see that there is an
easy reconciliation between difference and domination. I do
not want to exclude Derrida or grammatology from the
coalition, but I do not want them to dominate it.
This brings me to the second area of my uneasiness.
to indicate how far the shoots grow from the Shakespearean stem."

Shakespeare is the vine and his adapters are the branches: this hardly seems neutral, or conducive to a strong valorization of what are mere offshoots. Her foreword begins,

It is easy to predict a conclusion to this book: Shakespeare offshoots are not end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries? It was the expanding capital of a nation in an ongoing process of centralization. The destruction of the feudal baronial class was being conducted for the sake of a "neofeudal" (Cohen, 140), absolutist monarchy: "All government was now national government, the king's government" (Hill, 28). The securing of centralized power

"We must begin with the possibility of that total system" (45), writes Derrida. It must be said that this total system is "a 'total' system, open, let us say, to all possible investments of sense." It must be said again and again. We will encounter this totalizing project, a totalizing open to differences, throughout our coalition, and it is important, in the face of the need for totalization, to remind totalization to stay open to differences. In Spivak's words, when we speak of this "'total' system" we
Shakespeare. Or, a little less tersely, no modern Shakespeare offshoot has improved upon the original. Maybe so, but more interesting—and even enthralling—to me has been the investigation of which moderns rewrote Shakespeare. Why and how? (vii)

Here we have a combination gave the nation a pronounced, if tenuous, political stability under the preeminence of what survived of the late feudal nobility (Cohen 137), the hegemonic class.

This political stability, however, was accompanied by social and economic changes which eventually undermined it. With the decline of the baronial class came the rise of the gentry. The absolutist monarchy was dependent

must write of a "heterogeneous concept" (1987, 118). Can any concept be heterogeneous enough for our purposes? The urge to dominate is endemic, is one side of each practice in our coalition: the urge to expand, to redefine itself in such a way as to subsume all difference. Adaptation is not immune to this urge, or should we say structural impetus? Part of the work in this discussion will be to map out the alterity between domination and difference, especially in the attempts to define such practices as citation, transla-
of organicist evaluable-ness: the branches can never match the vine (one standard extrapolation: so why bother?), and pseudo-scientific neutrality. This is more or less the pattern her book follows in its discussion of particular "texts" (although she does not hesitate to summarize production details, her general evaluation of the adapt-

upon the support of this class, a class on the rise, so that laws, such as the Statute of Artificers of 1563 had to be set up not merely "to freeze a static hierarch-
cical society," but also to insist "that the gentry should benefit in the first place from such mobility as was unavoidable" (Hill, 57). During the 'Elizabethan Compromise' the neofeudal monarchy and the early

tion, and parody.

The third area of my uneasiness: it is necessary to keep track of the heterogeneous specific differences of the concept/practices of adaptation. Adaptation must be neither hegemonic nor subordinate in the coalition. Adaptation itself must remain a heterogeneous concept. It is not subject to (a simple) definition. Adaptations themselves must be allowed their specific differences: in the face of the specific history of adaptations, the few I
tion against the 'original' capitalist gentry lived in an uneasy but not a lasting peace:

By the time that the gentry became collectively as strong as the feudal baronage had been in the fifteenth century, able to claim privileges and powers for the House of Commons such as had previously been claimed for the House of Lords.

choose to examine must be neither hegemonic nor subordinate, only related. A radical heterogeneity implies that these concepts and practices can never be fully elaborated, and certainly won't be here. All is for the nonce.

To re-cite (resituate, recontextualize) myself: are translation, citation, and parody subsets of adaptation? Are the death of the author and the law of genre part of what André Lefevere calls "rewriting, in all its forms"? Can Deleuze and Guattari's "minor literature" function as an
The collage of the classic [sic] Hamlet was Marowitz' choice for the first production of his company at the Open Space Theatre in London, toward whose functioning he applied for a grant of twenty thousand pounds from the British Arts Council, a branch of the paternalist...

...it was too late for Stuart governments to reverse the process. (Hill, 31)

...The result was, in the 1640s, a political revolution "which led to greater commercial influence" over the government (Hill, 13).

...The hegemonic monarchy, the residual aristocracy, and emergent gentry were joined by a long suffering lower class. If London was the adequate umbrella term? Or would it be better to forget our umbrella? Can one of the set be made the original or source for the others? If not how are they to be related in their specific differences? How can a general theory of the set lead to an illumination of a specific practice? How can an illumination of specific practices lead to a general theory?

I propose to see these practices--theatre, adaptation, (de)authorization, rewriting/rereading, (de)genreification, translation, citation, parody, decanonization, minor
society he is rebelling against, perhaps not at quite every turn. (221)

I suppose this could also be seen as Cohn not hesitating to summarize production details.

Against Shakespeare as the great textual tree, the original, from which adaptations, always lesser (this has been determined neutrally), organically

political, economic, religious, and literary (Hill, 27) centre of the Nation, 90% of the population still lived in the countryside (Cohen, 140). If London was growing to perhaps 200,000, as many as 30,000 of these were "idle persons or masterless men" (Hill, 45-46).

Unemployment was high (Hill, 21); many lived at or below the poverty line (Hill, 45).

And yet, if London was a

literature—in a system of affinities and differences, such that no one term can be definitive, or to see them, politically, as a coalition, with shared or at least not, for the nonce, incompatible aims, motivations, and methodologies, informing each other, and yet not reducible to one another.

We will need, therefore, to be rigorously unrigorous, avoiding systematization for its own sake, respecting disharmony and fragmentation when to avoid them would be reductionist.
grow, we might set Shakespeare as spear, a cultural artifact, a stage prop, a weapon. The adaptor merely shakes the Shakespeare. But here we pose the question, "What is Shakespeare?" ("What is the original?") which must be asked whenever we ask "What is a Shakespeare adaptation?"

We now come to Cohn's own classification of city, not of displaced rural communities, but of displaced individuals (Van den Berg, 39), where carnivalized, popular traditions were largely on the wane (Weimann, 178), plebeian culture was not eradicated or completely under the sway of the hegemonic classes. Michael Bristol argues, "In the early modern period...plebeian culture still retained some degree of immunity from the

In examining these concept-activities I am not proposing or pretending to enter into a complex understanding of the specificity of each. Such a task is well beyond me. I do not propose to enlighten the study of each, except insofar as I contribute to a general theory of--supply your own nonce word--to which each relates. Any specific enlightenment will be limited to adaptation in particular, and certain adaptations in particular, with their specific practices and differences which escape the sameness of the
Shakespeare offshoots, which she proposes in place of the manic, arbitrary array of names. First there is the category "reduction/emendation."

This includes almost every professional production of Shakespeare: lines are cut, words are emended; but these offshoots remain close to the "Shakespearean text." This category of offshoots is excluded from destructive effects of capitalism" (48); Maurice Evans argues that although carnival values were suppressed from the late 16th century (212), they continued to irrupt in events such as the 1607 Digger insurrection in Warwickshire (234), and reached their height in the peasant revolts of the 1640s (232). There is some disagreement as to the nature of this plebeian culture.

general theory. The specificity of these adaptations will finally raise the question of their specific place in (cultural) history, and their specific cultural, historical, political tasks. At this point the study of adaptation enters into an "open" marxism (Derrida 1980, 22) (which cannot be defined as marxism?), and takes up a specific place in a theory and practice of (cultural) materialism. The remainder of this dissertation, in different ways, takes up and continues this task.
the study "because reduction/emendations are properly considered as theater history rather than literary alteration" (3). Evans seems to think of it as revolutionary and transformative—like a deconstruction with class solidarity (244); Bristol believes that, although it could entertain utopian fantasies, carnival was not primarily concerned with macrosocioeconomic history, but with what Fernand Braudel calls "the structures of everyday life" (49): carnival was predominantly conservative, concerned

[February 2, 1989: 1) The term adaptation is useful for two reasons. First, it stresses the efficacy of environment in the process of change: one adapts something, but one also adapts to some situation. Secondly, adaptation is a process which doesn't imply a simple movement from a prior or original form to a later or indebted form. Offshoot implies stem and branches; derivation implies source and tributary. An adaptation is only an instance in the general process of adaptation. However, with its biological implications
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[February 2, 1989: 1] The term adaptation is useful for two reasons. First, it stresses the efficacy of environment in the process of change: one adapts something, but one also adapts to some situation. Secondly, adaptation is a process which doesn't imply a simple movement from a prior or original form to a later or indebted form. Offshoot implies stem and branches; derivation implies source and tributary. An adaptation is only an instance in the general process of adaptation. However, with its biological implications
decorum, genre and classification, which, once again, place limitations and categorizations on an activity which transgresses them. Finally, the act of exclusion is problematic. First there is the exclusion of "uncut Shakespeare plays," as rare as these may be. These are assumed not to be offshoots, although this category would include Peter Brook's with maintaining plebeian traditions against the encroachment of hegemonic classes. Dominick LaCapra points out that Bakhtin, from whom all these ideas of carnival 'originate,' tends to exclude certain pathological aspects of carnival-type phenomena, such as victimization and repressive social control, and that The nature of carnival is obviously bound up

("All life is an adaptation.") adaptation as a metaphor/definition is not immune to the urge to dominate and expand.

2) With the talk of an open marxism and political commitment, this writing runs into contradictions and dilemmas, contradictions and dilemmas which will appear in other citations: in Teresa de Lauretis' double project of critique and affirmation, in Gayatri Spivak's "non-fit" of theory and practice and subsequent call for a "wild" relationship between the two, in Barthes' slippery distinc-
production of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* which was almost completely faithful to "the text." I intend to show how inadequate an understanding of Brook's work such a view entails. Ultimately I will argue that there is no theatrical production which can be thought to fall outside the process of adaptation. Then there is the exclusion of the vast majority of with the nature of the rest of social and cultural life, and its function depends, at times in complex ways, upon the variations of that mutual rela-
tionship. (295-296) Despite these differences of interpretation, we can see a consensus (*pace* Tillyard) that, as Weimann says, there was a highly transitional tion between "politics" and "the political" (*The Grain of the Voice*, 218), in Julia Kristeva's call for a heterogen-
eous dialectic of experience, "truth," and social practice (Revolution in Poetic Language, 202-207), and in Paul Smith's elaborate attempt, via a "double strategy" (152) and a "paradoxical articulation" (153), to distinguish or salvage a political practice or agency from theories of the subject. There is in these texts a common assertion of a need for political efficacy—indeed texts will have some
productions of Shakespeare which reduce and emend, and so are Shakespeare offshoots. There is nothing wrong in narrowing one's focus, and Cohn makes it clear that she is doing so. But I think this is being done without an adequate examination of the category being excluded: if the vast majority of offshoots must be excluded in order to study offshoots, then any disagreement might be as to political efficacy whether we will or no, the politics of the text is inescapable—and an admission that this efficacy can only be achieved in the face of contradiction and a certain (theoretical) duplicity. Affirming that need, for political efficacy, this text is not free of that theoretical duplicity: it is always tempted to run together différence, differences, and the political projects of the lefts. At other times it realizes that différence and differences have no necessary political alignment, and yet can be taken
definitions which are built on only a small minority of adaptations must be held under suspicion.

Cohn then goes on to define the two categories of offshoot which she will study:

\textit{Adaptation}, probably the most overused term for a Shakespeare offshoot, will constitute the second group. Christopher

how many hands this balancing act involves: was there a simple two sided opposition, or was there what Julia Kristeva might call "dialectical heterogeneity" (1984, 155)?

So, London is the centre of this nation, this heterocosm, in some ways autonomous from it, unrepresentative, in other ways its image (Van den Berg, 38); and the theatres, at least the national up, as Gramsci takes up \textit{The Prince}, for the use of leftist political goals.

3) Ian Sowton has questioned me about the use of square brackets throughout this text; he wonders whether brackets imply a hierarchy and therefore whether relegating certain writing to square brackets implies that this writing is dispensable. I would hope that the effect of the brackets is less one of hierarchy than of a shifting gestalt: which is figure, which is ground? They are also used in an
Spencer supplies a definition: "The typical adaptation includes substantial cuts of scenes, speeches, and speech assignments; much alteration of language; and at least one and usually several important (or scene-length) additions." Additions are crucial in theatres, Shakespeare's theatres, are in London, or at least in the northern suburbs and later across the river, within sight of the seats of power. This raises a set of questions at least as contentious as those dealing with the politics of carnival: the relation between hegemonic power, various sources of resistance, and Renaissance theatre.

attempt to avoid totally effacing the temporality of composition: this text is the product of an incomplete revision. They are also a product of writing on a word processor, which greatly facilitates later interjections. I'm afraid that they make reading this text somewhat more difficult. However, sitting here looking at words flash by on a video screen, where a wayward sleeve or a misplaced finger is capable of making drastic and unintended changes, I am most aware of this text as something eminently (re)wri-
distinguishing reduc-
tion/emendation from
adaptation, but my
definition is wider
than Spencer's,
including plays that
are relatively
faithful to Shake-
spere's story,
however far they
depart from his
text...
Invention will be
the basis for the

[It may seem out of place
for us to be entering into
contemporary interpretive
debates when we are supposed
to be reconstructing Henry V
'in Shakespeare's playhouse';
but no reconstruction can be
simply historical. Here are
some pronouncements on the
subject:
the search for the true
Shakespeare amounts to
a modern rewriting,
either a useful approp-

able, not something to be read. In the transition,
translation, adaptation to fixed words on the page, the
square brackets, the unreadability, are the trace of the
'origin' of this text in another technology.]

Let us begin with the concept of text.
Having relegated Derrida to the margins, we must once
again re(in)state him. Here he is on text:
I found it necessary to recast the concept of text
by generalizing it almost without limit, in any
third grouping, transformation. This "brightest heaven of invention" is studded with stars of varying brilliance. Shakespearean characters are often simplified or trundled through new events, with the Shakespearean ending scrapped. In transformations Shakespearean

ration of the past for present needs or an ideologically misguided imposition that effaces historical difference; (Cohen, 25)

All commentary is a production, which is then assimilated to the text as part of its material history; (Evans, 34)

case without present or perceptible limit, without any limit that is. That's why there is nothing "beyond the text." That's why South Africa and apartheid are, like you and me, part of this general text, which is not to say that it can be read the way one reads a book. That's why the text is always a field of forces: heterogeneous, differential, open, and so on. That's why deconstructive readings and writings are concerned
characters move through a partly or wholly non-Shakespearean plot, sometimes with introduction of non-Shakespearean characters. (3-4)

Cohn is quite wide in her understanding of transformation, including, for instance, as transformations of *King Lear*, Freud's "The Theme of the not only with library books, with discourses, with conceptual and semantic contexts...They are also effective or active (as one says) interventions, in particular political and institutional interventions that transform contexts without limiting themselves to theoretical or constative utterances even though they must also produce such utterances. ("But beyond," 165-166)

The first thing to note is the expansion of the definition
Caskets" (245-246) and Political or historical
Marshall McLuhan's The criticism, such as this work
Gutenberg Galaxy (248-250). you are reading attempts to
I applaud Cohn's openness be, is, of course, like all
to a fairly undelimited criticism an ideological and
notion of transformation--historically specific
although I must lament that (re)production (Howard and
she finds it necessary to O'Connor, 12).
deprecate such transforma-
tions:
If criticism and inter-
pertions--even so 'objec-
tive' a practice as recon-
tructions--can not be simply
structurally neutral and
objective, they need not be
of text, an expansion without limit, what I have called the
structural urge to dominate. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of such an expansion, especially in relation
to the theory and practice of theatrical adaptation?
The first gain is a way to conceive of the relations
between text in the narrow sense and context, since both are
aspects of text in the unlimited sense. And so we have
Spivak's 'definition' of textuality as a "network of
politics-history-society-sexuality" (1987, 121). There is
tions from widely various sources, he states that The Gutenberg Galaxy "begins with the interplay of cultures via commerce and ends with the dissolution of the tribal state, even as it is dramatized by Shakespeare in King Lear." Even after the idiosyncratic readings of something similar in the movement by Foucault from discourse analysis in the narrow sense to the analysis of the "apparatus":

What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—
Lear that have filled this chapter, it is somewhat startling to learn that is what Shakespeare was dramatizing in King Lear. (248)

Despite this seeming openness, Cohn's categories make rigid distinctions that are ultimately untenable. Transformation seems to be a possibility latent in adaptation: make the city walls in areas that were known as the liberties.

In a recent work, Steven Mullaney argues that the liberties, which in Renaissance England were expanding yet marginalized places which eluded the control city government was able to exercise within the city proper, gave to the theatres a site where customary limits, taboos, and cultural definitions could be suspen-

short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations than can be established between these elements. (Foucault 1980, 194)

This sense of the text or apparatus opens onto a renewed political analysis. Rather than a hermeticization of the literary, of text as independent of context, this new sense of textuality allows us to move to an understanding of
enough scene-length additions and substantial cuts and you end up with scrapped endings, new events, new plots, and new characters. In fact, the variations inherent in what Cohn calls adaptation include at one extreme the uncut text (no cuts, no additions) and at the other a totally unrecognizable variation (everything from the original cut, all text ded (82). Mullaney argues that because of this freedom from hegemonic restraint, the public theatres of London were not a minor irritation but a real threat to political order (53). There are, however, several objections to this reading of the situation. If the liberties were expanding in Renaissance England, it was not because of a breakdown in the authority of urban govern-

the ubiquity of the political both inside and outside the text in the narrow sense. This understanding affords an entrance onto a new stage of political analysis:

The crucial contemporary agenda is elaborating the relations that join the nexus of classroom, discipline and profession to such political areas as those of gender, race, and class, as well as nation. (Arac, xxx)

While such an agenda certainly complicates political action,
new). Adaptation then is a (dis)continuum which includes everything from absolute fidelity to absolute transformation and infidelity. If we add to this the need to see how the performance text can also be dealt with by varying amounts of cuts, additions, and modifications, we may start to have an adequate model for studying any Shakespearean... it also extends its scope, problematizing yet opening its possibilities. Cultural activities of whatever kind, dramatic, theatrical, literary, etc., etc., can/must now be read in their sociopoliticality. At the same time material reality is more fully conceptualized as constructed, "written." All human activity enters a common conceptual field of political endeavour. The politicized study of theatre can only benefit from this: theatre can be seen as a sociocultural event, an apparatus, in which ticket prices,
production from the most faithful to the most unfaithful. What we will discover, however, is that fidelity on one level runs athwart infidelity on another, that there is neither absolute fidelity nor infidelity, that there are only strategies of adaptation.

A second piece of the literature on adaptation is "Translations, Adaptations, seating, the costumes of both audience and performers, etc., etc., are subject to analysis.

There is a potential disadvantage in this new understanding of text: can we think of an unlimited textuality without making a conceptual or practical reduction of the differences between boots, bread, and books? The unlimited text is made up of heterogeneous elements and this heterogeneity runs the risk of being effaced by too simple or unified a notion of textuality. In particular, textuality argues that these areas outside city control, if at all places of subversion, were places where feudal economics were being subverted by the new world of commodity exchange (112). The liberties, therefore, may have been a strange mixing ground of carnival, capitalism, and neofeudal authority. The theatres of Renaissance London were small, nondescript places, on the
Variations: A Conversation with Eric Bentley." This is an edited version (adaptation? abridgement? offshoot?) of a conversation Joel Schechter had with Bentley in September 1985; it appeared in Theater in the Fall of 1986. What we have of this conversation is far-reaching, complex, and problematic, and calls for a careful analysis.

...wrong side of the river, unmonumental, wooden, and prone to destruction by fire.

...And yet, if attendance means anything, they must have served a pronounced role in the cultural life of the city. Cohen estimates that in 1595, when London's population was 150,000, theatre attendance was...600,000 (168); Weimann estimates that in 1605, with a population of 160,000,

as a concept/metaphor threatens to conceive of all elements in this heterogeneous relationship as reducible to the verbal. Recall one of our earlier citations from Derrida, that writing is not the proper name of différence (although the 'science' of that différence is to be grammatology).

Then look again at a phrase from his exposition of the concept of text: "which is not to say that [this general text] can be read the way one reads a book." On the one hand this goes far to undercut the hegemony of a literary
The conversation ranges over many interconnected issues, but at the end Schechter asks Bentley to "re-cap this conversation," which Bentley, with the help of Schechter, does by outlining, as in the piece's title, a sequence, in descending order of fidelity to the "original," from translation through adaptation to variation.

To begin with translation, theatre attendance was 21,000 per week (171); effectively, the theatre audience was "everyone" (174), at least everyone who lived in London. Stephen Orgel, on the other hand, argues that there was an underclass of Londoners who could not have afforded to attend the theatre with any regularity (8). There is a consensus that in the Renaissance theatre mattered more than it does conception of textuality; on the other hand, it leaves it intact: if the general text cannot be read like a book, it can still in some way be "read": the primacy of the verbal reasserts itself. (It should be noted, however, that Derrida opens up the concept of translation, for instance, in the face of Jakobson's idea of "proper" translation as interlingual (Ear of the Other, 95) and Lacan's "linguistic" metaphorization of translation (108), to intersemiotic possibilities, for example from verbal to nonverbal
Michael Bristol argues now. That whereas our theatre has a "diminished capacity to achieve its social and political purpose" (4), and whereas we tend to think of Shakespeare as most importantly a literary figure, that in the Renaissance, it was the theatricality of Shakespeare's work which was most important:

The social and political life of the theater (95).)

If I caution against a too verbal understanding of theatre, it is a strategic intervention, the mirror (reflection and reversal) of the intervention of Elinor Fuchs in "Presence and the Revenge of Writing." If she is addressing an audience of theatre practitioners, then the concept of writing may help to subvert hegemonic notions of the presence of the body and speech. But I assume that this dissertation will find its (first) audience in a university
vision of their great original. (8)

There are several points that must be engaged here.

First, the linking of the task of translator and director allows us to see translation as a subcategory or subactivity of the larger category of the faithful production. If the classic original is in English then the task of faithful (intralingual) as a public gathering place has an importance of its own over and above the more exclusively literary interests of texts and the contemplation of their meaning. Because of its capacity to create and sustain a briefly intensified social life, the theater is festive and political as well as literary--a

English Literature department, where the hegemony of writing as a concept/metaphor threatens to limit the study of theatre and culture.

For the study of theatrical adaptation it is important that the concept of text open onto the nonverbal text. One particular difference which sets theatrical adaptation apart from translation, citation, parody, etc., etc., is that it is not primarily a literary or verbal activity. Keir Elam, following Tadeusz Kowzan, stipulates twelve or more nonver-
translation is unnecessary (although modernization of, for example, Shakespeare's English—a practice which, at least in small doses, is widespread (what Cohn calls emendation)—would make even homolingual production into a form of translation). In the case of foreign classics faithful translation is essential before we can come directly to the larger task of privileged site for the celebration and critique of the needs and concerns of the polis. (3) Other reasons are given for the importance of theatre in the Renaissance. Hill points out the deliberate use of art by the monarchy for propaganda purposes (41)—much as television is used today—and the new historicists, such as Stephen Greenblatt and

bal signifying systems at play in theatrical performance (50), systems which are elided when theatre is "read" as literature. Now this is not to disagree with Roland Barthes when he says/writes, "it's impossible to consider a cultural object outside of the articulated, spoken, and written language which surrounds it" (Barthes 1985, 65); but I do take exception to his designation, in the case of fashion, for instance, of the nonverbal as "a very poor code," so that clothing is reduced to the signification of the
faithful production.

What is a faithful production? We cannot answer this question without asking any number of other questions. What is fidelity? What is the original? What in the original is fidelity faithful to? These questions are equally applicable to producing an English play as they are to producing a play in trans-

Jonathan Goldberg, have argued that power in early modern England was "itself deeply theatrical," and therefore the theatre was "a prime location for the representation and legitima-
tion of power" (Dollimore 1985, 3). In this regard Thomas Stroup discusses the connections between theatri-
cal pageantry and real life pageantry (89), and the implications of these language which seconds it.

The complex relations between meaning, the verbal, and the nonverbal are at play in a number of essays in Barthes's Image, Music, Text. Although we have seen that Barthes on fashion argues that the nonverbal is a poor signifying code, he finds, when writing on an advertisement for pasta, that the verbal must anchor the nonverbal, not because the nonverbal means too little, but because it can mean too much. The nonverbal image is polysemous (39), "bound up
What is fidelity? Fidelity is a respect one owes to a "classic." A classic is "absolutely sound in all its parts" (14). George Puttenham, in *The Arte of English Poesie*, saw the court—like the theatre—as a privileged site of counterfeiting, deception, and mask making; he writes, for instance, of the "profession of a very Courtier, which is in plaine termes, cunningly to be able to dissemble" (250).

with an uncertainty." In the face of our "terror of uncertain signs" the verbal is used to "fix," or "control" (40) the nonverbal image. This is not to argue, once again, that the nonverbal can ever be simply nonverbal; and the polysemy of the image is always already translated into words: "'Italianicity'" (33), "'shopping around for oneself'" (34), "'still life'" (35). The polysemy of the nonverbal is always already verbal.

But if the nonverbal cannot be simply nonverbal, it is...
Jean Baudrillard argues that theatre is a privileged form in the Renaissance, or protocapitalist culture of "first-order simulacra," a primal counterfeit ing of or deviation from the natural order: "Theatre is the form which takes over social life ...from the Renaissance on" (87); the age of counterfeit is "the time of the double and the mirror, of theatre and the games of mask and

also not simply verbal. Barthes also studies "the grain of the voice" (181), "the body in the voice as it sings" (188), "signifying weight" (185), which allows an escape from "the tyranny of meaning" (185), which is "an area of resistance to meaning" (32), which "exceeds culture" (183), which bears "traces of signifiance" (185) -- "What we call signifiance, then, is precisely this unlimited and unbounded generating process, this unceasing operation of the drives toward, in, and through language" (Kristeva 1984, 17). Now I want to
arrogance. When discussing the infidelities in his translation of Brecht's *Good Woman of Setzuan*, Bentley says,

> Only I could be arrogant (like Beckett) and claim that the rewrite is truer to the spirit of the original. If you say "prove it," I can only offer my text to other

appearance" (98). In the terminology of Michel Foucault we might argue that the theatre was the privileged heterotopy of the English Renaissance. Heterotopies are special, quasi-public spaces which function to reflect, expose, invert, support, and compensate for the world around them (24-27). Sitting across the river from the centre of power, a power perhaps for

question the appeal to nature which is and is not in the idea of signifiance as the (always already articulated) psycho-material basis of language, at the same time as I want to appropriate the concept/metaphor of grain to indicate a nonverbal textuality. We might for the nonce think of a texturality, which keeps the ideas of culture, weaving, and grain and yet distances the idea of text from the (simply) verbal.

If theatre studies can make use of a notion of text
people's judgment.

(7) There are several points to be looked at in this passage, but for now let us note only that there is a decision, a judgment to be made as to what is classic and unimprovable and what is flawed and improvable. "Improvement is good by definition" (5). Who, then, decides what is improvable and what indeed is flawed and improvable. The debates begin again when we try to discover the effective relations between that power and the theatre. What political purposes did Renaissance theatre actually serve? Renaissance theatre was subject to pressure from the

which opens onto context and the nonverbal, they can also make use of a notion of textuality as a heterogeneous signifi(c)ance. A complication of the notion of the theatrical text, of the relevant-to-analysis, shatters the idea of the unity of theatrical meaning. Gerald Rabkin writes, "In sum, the text is the ensemble of messages we feel we must read as a whole," and "Anything we read as a coherent ensemble of messages constitutes a text" (Rabkin 1985, 151); Keir Elam, in discussing the notion of theatri-
is a genuine improvement? Bentley does not engage this question specifically, although he does offer grounds upon which judgments in other particulars are made. At one point in the conversation the question is raised as to who decides what is a correct interpretation. Bentley's answer is "You. Me. Whoever" (6). Schechter asks if the neofeudal hegemony, most strikingly in the censorship it was forced to labour under, which included both the compulsory inspection of manuscripts before production and the possibility of prosecution after production. Among the subjects that the theatre was not allowed to deal with were criticisms of the policies or conduct of the government, personal attacks on influential cal "semiotization," quotes Jiri Veltrusky: "All that is on the stage is a sign" (7). Such assertions need not lead so much to a gathering in of disparate signs under a renewed unity, as to an opening up of the theatrical text onto the disunity of the relevant-to-analysis. For example, in May of 1987 I saw a production of Measure for Measure at the Young Vic in London. At this production there were stage hands whose job was to keep the audience from stepping on the stage on the way to their seats: the stage was in the
decision is then entirely subjective—"Chacun a son gout." Bentley’s response is somewhat slippery:

Chacun a son gout

But it’s not entirely subjective. There can be a kind of consensus and, in any case, one tests one’s brute, "subjective" reaction by reference to a good many "objective" people, and religious controversies—except for slanderous attacks on dissenters (Bentley 1971, 161-167).

In terms of relations of economic power, Elizabethan theatre was structured around a contradiction: dependent upon the Monarchy and neofeudal class for support, prestige, and a certain financial bounty; dependent upon the support of an urban middle and lower class

middle of the auditorium and was covered with shiny black tile which caught every dusty footprint. By the end of the evening, however, the actors had transformed that polished pristine space into a dusty record of their every movement. Everything on stage is a sign. What did these footprints mean? One could homogenize them and relate them to the theme of inevitable corruption explored by the play; one could fault the director for allowing such an uncontrolled and irrelevant signifier to disrupt the unity of the
facts. Nor does one rest content with a brute reaction. One hopes to achieve a considered reaction. How far "'objective' facts" can take one in deciding between correct and incorrect interpretations is debatable; however, as to what is a classic and what needs or could stand improvement, it is dubious that such a decision could audience for the bulk of its livelihood. It was, like the society around it, structured around the "interaction of two ultimately irreconcilable modes of production" (Cohen, 82): "Partly medieval and feudal, partly modern and bourgeois, it was in essence neither" (84). With some of its roots in rural peasant or folk theatre (Cohen, 36-39)—until the middle of Elizabeth's reign almost all production; one could analyze the ideology of the proper/the clean in our public institutional spaces, or the limits, even in theatre-in-the-round, imposed upon audience participation and sign production; one could use this 'wild' signification to undo the conceptual unity of the theatrical event: the complexity of the text cannot end in one purpose; one could claim that the footprints are somewhat meaningless—although their meaninglessness would not necessarily exclude them from the relevant-to-analysis. Spivak cautions
ever be based on these criteria. It is in another part of the conversation that Bentley hints, perhaps without fully intending to, at a more adequate grounding of this question.

Yale Rep has rejected Bentley's variation on Schnitzler. Why? "The rejection slip I get informs me they don't want any more Schnitzler. They are just about to do theatre in Britain was amateur (Bentley 1971, 3)—it was no longer folk theatre, "but a highly complex Renaissance stage" (Weimann, xv), a commercial urban theatre in the capital city (Cohen, 120). It was not a communal but an economic endeavour (Weimann, 170), a postfeudal, petty commodity industry (176), perhaps more complex than, but not atypical of the urban indus-

against an easy use of the idea of meaninglessness, and yet if texturality can have meaning which is not simply verbal, then meaning with all its verbal connotations may not be strategically useful as a nomenclature for such nonverbal meaning. In theatre semiotics there is a spectrum of approaches from the systematizing, conceptualizing, verbalizing work of Elam, through the fragmented, wary explorations of Patrice Pavis, to the antisemiotics of Jean-François Lyotard, where semiotics is seen as not only logocentric but
another Schnitzler, you see" (8). "But presumably not Variations thereon?" Schechter asks. No, replies Bentley, New Haven wants "the great dramatists chemically pure." So, Yale Rep has decided that La Ronde is a classic, unimprovable, and to be presented—if they wanted more Schnitzler—"chemically pure." But Bentley and Schechter are not satisfied tries around it. Within these "extremely complex relations" (Weimann, 112), within this temporary stability and synthesis (161), the company of which Shakespeare was a member, the Lord Chamberlain’s Men, later the King’s Men, was successful to such an extent as to make it uncharacteristic of theatre companies of the time. Shakespeare’s company was the only company which

ethnocentric, so that the practice and study of theatre is not to be based on signs, but on "libidinal displacements" (Carlson, 506).

This opening onto the disunity of the theatrical event is important in understanding the myriad strategies of adaptation. For some adapters of Shakespeare the text in the narrow sense is of little interest, and their adaptations make much more use of elements of context and sceno-ography. In some cases, Carmelo Bene, for example, the
with this explanation. To understand why we must look at the ways in which Bentley has rewritten La Ronde. Three things have been changed: the place, the time, the sexual orientation. La Ronde: Vienna, 1890, heterosexual; Round Two: America, 1970, gay. Bentley's act of rewriting is a political act; it arises out of an engagement with his own was its own landlord—the most lucrative position in the industry (Bentley 1984, 14-15)—the most stable (12), the most highbrow (14) and neofeudal ideologically, regularly called to the court to perform (235). The question facing those on the left is, what possible relation to subversion, resistance, and residual folk values could such a theatre entertain?

interest in scenography is tied to an assertion of the meaningless, that which escapes verbal significance. Even if this assertion is ultimately untenable, it is important to understand the way the struggle/relation between meaning and meaninglessness informs this work.

The concept of textuality as a relation or interchange between the elements or texts in the narrow sense which make up the unlimited text, leads into the concepts of intertextuality and citation. Barthes writes,
sociosexual situation which Schnitzler's play seems to lack. Bentley himself has provided the answer to the questions he has asked of others who have rewritten or adapted so-called classics and masterpieces without hoping or intending to "improve" upon them: "who needs it?" (5); "But merely to depart in order to depart? Is that good enough?" (5). One doesn't

The most pessimistic position is taken up by several of the "new historicists." Stephen Greenblatt, for instance, in "Invisible bullets: Renaissance author-ity and its subversion, Henry IV and Henry V," argues that "Shakespeare's plays are centrally and repeatedly concerned with the production and containment of subversion and disorder" (29), so that subversive elements are

any text is an intertext; other texts are present in it...the texts of the previous and surrounding culture. Any text is a new tissue of past citations...Intertextuality, the condition of any text whatsoever, cannot, of course, be reduced to a problem of sources or influences; the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae whose origin can scarcely ever be located; of uncons-cious or automatic quotations, given without
depart merely to depart; anyone who feels that a work, unimprovable as it may be, does not address the present situation, and feels compelled to address that situation, needs to rewrite. And that is a good enough reason.

And what has been Yale Rep's reaction to the sexual politics of Bentley's variation:

JS: ...Couldn't it be "pressed into service as defenders of the established order" (30-31), and that "Theatricality then is not set over against power but is one of power's essential modes" (33).

These views have been debated in any number of locations. Michael Bristol questions their presentation of opposition as folly and struggle as useless (15), and believes rather that "To its quotation marks. Epistemologically, the concept of intertext is what brings to the theory of the text the volume of sociality. (1981, 39)

The concept of intertextuality gives to the concept of textuality a notion of social creation, of production as always reproduction: in culture there is no simply raw material. What it must receive from textuality is a more than verbal dimension: the intertextu(r)ality of theatre includes such things as seating arrangements, stage design,
that they won't do a gay play?

EB: ...has Yale Rep done ANYTHING with the gay theme?

JS: No.

EB: Can we discuss that?

JS: Certainly.

EB: Otherwise I'd have to conclude that Yale Rep, opponents and even to some of its supporters, the theater represents a genuine rupture in the fabric of social authority" (110). In a recent article articulating the new historicism with feminist studies of Shakespeare, Peter Erickson argues that the pessimism of the new historicists' readings of Shakespeare is symptomatic of "a political emptiness implicit in new historicism"

and lighting. Intertextuality gives to adaptation the ubiquity of borrowing, the impossibility of absolute originality, either in Shakespeare's text or in the text of adaptations. It also expands the range of what is being adapted, and what must be studied as adaptation: not just "discoverable filiation or a willed imitation," but citations "at varying levels in more or less recognizable forms." And so, an intertextual study of Shakespeare's texts moves from a narrow study of sources, in which
which has shown (335), which can be found in interest in the its attitudes not only to the rights of South Renaissance but to the Africans, is much present. I would suggest less concerned with that this has something to do gay Americans. with a 'misreading' of the Renaissance which seems JSt Maybe we should characteristic of the new set up a separate historicism: in Baudrillard's discussion for that? terms it reads the first order simulacra of the EB: All right. (8) Renaissance as if they were Consensus is political. the third order simulacra of Aesthetic judgment is political. The decision to postmodernism or late/post-

Shakespeare as author always improves upon and makes his own the specific work of an inferior precursor, to a study of the ubiquity of the intertextuality of the text, to see it not as the work of a freestanding, originating author but as part of (a) network(s) of sociocultural apparatuses. According to Antoine Compagnon, citation, which may seem only "un trait périphérique de la lecture et de l'écriture" (12), when liberated from its "définition restreinte, attachée aux guillemets" (11), takes up its place at the heart of a
see a work as pointless infidelity or legitimate variation is political. This explosion of the political into the discussion, and then its containment and sectioning off, is symptomatic both of insightfulness and of the confusion which mars Bentley's arguments. A political analysis at other points in the conversation would have allowed for a capitalism: a time of "total spatio-dynamic theatre" (139) in which "the schemes of control have become fantasti- cally perfected" (111). If this is true, it may mean that new historicism, while less important in understanding "the dead Shakespeare" (Erickson, 337) of the Renaissance, may be more important in understanding "the living Shakespeare" of contemporary adaptations.

theory of reading, writing, text, and book. "Toute écriture est glose et entreglose, toute énonciation répète," or to cite (Compagnon citing) Montaigne, "Nous ne faisons que nous entregloser" (9). Intergloss is "la hantise, l'idée fixe, l'obsession de l'écriture; elle en est l'origine et la limite" (9). All writing is second hand. (Must we warn once again against the hegemony of the verbal, and then against the totalizing tendencies of any useful concept: text, intertext, citation?)
much fuller understanding of some of the points raised.

For instance, Bentley refers to the American Repertory Theatre production of *Endgame*, which ignored Beckett's stage directions and which was consequently the object of a law suit instigated by Beckett. Bentley is puzzled by the production:

From discussion of Shakespeare's oppositional effectiveness is occupied by various voices. Maurice Evans argues that while the discourse of deconstruction resembles Elizabethan dramatic discourse (219), deconstruction, like Shakespeare's plays, is "a form of

In the face of this ubiquity of citation and Barthes's assertion that intertextuality cannot be reduced to a problem of sources or influences, theatrical adaptation of Shakespeare may seem a rather naive and limited activity. Yet Compagnon argues that a study of citation must in part be an historical one. Citation has a genealogy (and a semiology: a typology of quotation marks (10)), which studies "la pratique institutionnelle qu'engage la citation" (10). Citation is "un lieu stratégique et même politique
the Cambridge inversion stripped of carnival's class solidarity" (244), that—in distinction to the events of the 1640s—historical contradictions undergo a sublimation in the Elizabethan compromise, and are "displaced to the level of signs in the theatre" (261), that Shakespeare's text is produced "by its ideological overdetermination and not by a free conscience" (234), and finally that

dans toute pratique du langage" (12). Rather than analyzing citation in itself, "il importe d'explorer...les entregloses variées que sont tel et tel discours où elle s'affiche" (11). Adapters of Shakespeare have used, after all, even in our own time, various strategies of citation: a strict fidelity to the words, if not the arrangements, of Shakespeare (Stoppard's Fifteen Minute Hamlet, Schechner's Makbeth, Blau's adaptations), the introduction among Shakespeare's words of words 'of their own' (most of the works of
how that conclusion was reached. (4)

He is also relieved by Beckett's reaction:

He who is so reluctant to affirm anything does not hesitate to affirm his own importance!

If one cannot change Beckett any more than the Bible, the man does have some positive values after

Marowitz), the rejection of the words of Shakespeare (Dubois' Pericles), or the setting of citations from Shakespeare within a network of citations from elsewhere, thereby radically decentering the 'source' text (Müller's Hamlet-machine). Each case is a particular struggle of citation, a particular struggle with the existing cultural order. In those adaptations where citation is rigorously faithful—at least on the verbal level—it may be that this reinstatement of quotation marks, rather than, or as well as, narrowing

marxists should not take Shakespeare "as a prototype of the fellow-traveller" (231). Walter Cohen argues that while

To the extent that the radical agenda of the revolutionary decades remains the radical agenda of today, English Renaissance drama may retain both actual and utopian force, (28)
all. His own works are his bible.
In his article "Is There a Text On This Stage?" Gerald Rabkin not only addresses these two points (how are the limits of (in)fidelity arrived at and what are the limits of the author's authority), but he also raises questions of copy-right, literary property, and economic control (152-155), which Bentley, with the unprecedented conflicts and syntheses of the period provided "rich but difficult opportunities for the expression of popular and oppositional perspectives" (81), all popular impulses and subversive gestures necessarily stopped short of an opposing point of view, just as lower class rebellions failed in part from an inability to imagine a

the perceivable range of intertextuality, is a way of marking unmarked terms, marking cultural values where only naturalized values seem to exist, making Shakespeare into "Shakespeare," as one might make man into "man." It may also be that the strategy of focussing on one site/cite of cultural hegemony—even one play by Shakespeare—is one appropriate way of targeting practice. In any case, adaptations are important in as much as they actively and openly enter into the intertextual process—text as inter-
pervasive reorganization of society in the interests of the rebels. (29)

One must be wary of "overestimating the autonomy of the oppressed" (27), and "a purely popular theater cannot exist in a class society" (29). According to Robert Weimann, theatre was not a mere reflection, but "a potent force that helped create the specific character and transitional nature" of Elizabethan society (xii), and yet the text--thereby undermining the originality of both source and adaptation.

At this point the theory of adaptation intersects a theory of (re)reading. If all texts are founded upon other (similarly founded) texts (of the past), texts of the past are refounded in the readings of the present. If writing is readerly, reading can/must be writerly. Look, for instance, at the citations I have used as headings in this chapter: they are both recitings of past texts

his acute understanding of Yale Rep and sexual politics, could possibly have raised for himself.

We have left a number of questions which we must now attempt to address. Let us take up the question--not for the last time--what is the original? Bentley allows for some complexity in understanding this. There is, of course,
subversive dimension of such carnivalized aspects as the Lord of Misrule should not be exaggerated (24):

Right up to the end of the sixteenth century and well into the first decade of the seventeenth (that is, before the revolutionary movement gradually undermined the Tudor compromise in the theater) the conditions for the rise of and resitings, recontextualizations, in which the significance of the words is rewritten. Such a view of reading is in opposition to reading as "nothing more than a referendum" (Barthes 1974, 4) in which the reader "is left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text." The "writerly," on the other hand, makes "the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text."

How does such a project answer to Terry Eagleton's the dramatic text. As in Endgame, there is dialogue. There are also stage directions, but these are of several types. Beckett objected to a change of setting. Bentley feels that fidelity of setting is equally important in doing Chekhov (5). He objects to the Lincoln Center production of The Cherry Orchard which ended the play with images of factories
plebeian ideology did not exist. This was so partly because during the dissolution of the feudal order the contradictions between the popular tradition and the culture of the ruling classes were to some extent synthesized with the needs and aspirations of the new monarchy and were overshadowed by an overwhelming trenchant critique of "the Reader's Liberation Movement": "A socialist criticism is not primarily concerned with the consumers' revolution. Its task is to take over the means of production" (Against the Grain, 184)? If cultural production can always only be reproduction, if writing must always be involved in reading, then the activities of (re)reading and writing blur the distinctions between production, consumption, and reproduction. A politicized theory and in the background:
The production...was a misinterpretation. Not just of the ending but of the play's substance. Anton Chekhov wasn't the kind of person who saw factories coming. That was Maxim Gorky. (5)
But what if today someone were to look back at Chekhov--as
sense of national pride and unity.

Consequently, the theatre presented at best "only a playful kind of resistance" (26).

The most optimistic positions on theatre and resistance in the Renaissance are taken by Bristol and Dollimore. Bristol emphasizes the communal aspects of popular theatre as theatre as opposed to its strictly literary aspects:

Bentley looks back at Schnitzler—and see, with the aid perhaps of Gorky, the factories that arguably Chekhov didn't see coming? Why should this director not do The Cherry Orchard with factories? Because The Cherry Orchard is a classic and unimprovable? We have already rehearsed these arguments.
literature as objet d'art or as ideological finished product is subordinated to more active, though more ephemeral forms of institution-making carried over into theater from traditions of popular festive form. (4)

As we have seen, Bristol argues that whatever autonomy popular theatre was able to maintain was directed for the most part towards preserving the face of a long history of capitalist appropriations of literature. Renée Balibar has shown how a text of Georges Sand has been variously adapted/rewritten to serve the ideological state apparatuses (Bennett, 162-165); Alan Sinfield has shown how 'Shakespeare' has been adapted/rewritten by the British educational system; on April 9, 1988 (an) anonymous editorial writer(s) in the Globe and Mail used parody of Shakespeare to further conservative cultural

As to the question of misinterpretation, we already know that Bentley bases judgments in this area on "'objective' facts" and on consensus. We have already seen that consensus is a political consensus, and that one may, for political reasons, struggle against that consensus. "But that doesn't show that there isn't such a thing as a correct
status quo against the encroachments of absolutism and protocapitalism, and although its utopian side sometimes emerged (53), it is not this side which predominated. Dollimore's emphasis falls more on Renaissance dramatic texts as explicit or implicit sites of the subversion of hegemonic ideologies: they critique, demystify, reject, reveal contradictions and inconsistencies in, and undermine the institutions and ideology hegemony. Rereading is neither a politically innocent nor necessarily subversive practice. The rereading of cultural texts is analogous to what Gramsci claims of (his rereading of) Machiavelli: there is a knowledge/weapon which can be put into the hands of those whose ignorance of it has heretofore meant they could only suffer under its effects (Gramsci, 141-142).

Theatrical adaptation differs from this practice of rereading in several ways.

interpretation," says Bentley. "Of Hamlet, for example" (5). This leads Schechter to ask, "There is a single correct interpretation of Hamlet?" "No," answers Bentley, "But there are many incorrect interpretations of Hamlet." We could interpret this, there is no correct interpretation, only many incorrect ones, but it appears that Bentley means
of the relations of political power, and ultimately precipitate the rebellions of the 1640s (Dollimore 1984, 4-5). He also stresses the degree to which thinkers in the Renaissance, for instance Thomas Elyot and Fulke Greville (Dollimore 1985, 9), were capable of clearly thinking through relations of power and subversion, thereby arguing that the revolutionary potential of the age was not limited by an inability to formulate Rereading once again implies the primacy of the verbal, whereas adaptation is often a "rereading" of the contextual and the nonverbal. Also, adaptation takes up a different strategy of appropriation: rather than impose a new interpretation upon a text which remains in some way historically fixed, adaptation breaks with the fetishized 'givenness' of the past text and freely enters into its radical reproduction, rewriting it not only in its effects, but at the
to say that there are both many correct ("alternative correct" (6)) and many incorrect interpretations. "Who decides what's correct?" "You. Me. Whoever." But we've already rehearsed that too.

There are other stage directions to which one is less tightly bound:
truly revolutionary positions.

If we turn for a moment to feminist criticism of Shakespeare, we see a similar range of arguments. Kathleen McLuskie argues that Shakespeare, the "patriarchal Bard" (106), "gave voice to the social views of his age," and his "thoughts on women were necessarily bounded by the parameters of hagiography and misogyny" (Dollimore 1985, 11); feminist criticism must "assert the 'source': in the 'text itself.' Adaptation enters into the process of (re)production in a particularly strong way, in a way that 'mere' rereading does not; a symptom of this is the way adaptation enters into conflict with bourgeois copyright laws. Theatrical adaptation, then, moves the reader further along the path from consumer to (re)producer, answering in a particular way to the threefold task of "the revolutionary cultural

I attended Strasberg sessions where he would say, quite reasonably, that an actor should not feel held to an author's indication of delivery ("Loudly," or "In a muffled tone"), because the effect that one actor gets by shouting another gets by whispering, and so on. (4)
power of resistance, subverting rather than co-opting the domination" of Shakespeare (McLuskie, 106). Erickson echoes this position, arguing that the patriarchal bard is the purveyor of a "particular ideology of the feminine" that must be resisted (337). Linda Bamber, rejecting those feminists who find that Shakespeare "directly supports and develops feminist ideas" (1), is interested in "the feminine as a principle of worker" outlined by Eagleton:

First, to participate in the production of works and events which, within transformed 'cultural' media, so fictionalize the real as to intend those effects conducive to the victory of socialism. Second, as 'critic', to expose the rhetorical structures by which non-socialist works produce politically undesirable effects, as a way of

There are, adds Schechter, many classics that have no stage directions. "That's because everyone knew what the setting had to be," answers Bentley. "Often the shape of the theater was the setting" (5). But, if historical context is part of the setting and meaning of a play, this raises the problem of the impossibility of recreating that context and so of
Otherness...something unlike and external to the self, who is male" (4). In Shakespeare the feminine "is never the self and only irregularly a form of value" although the masculine's dialectic with the feminine, by which the masculine defines itself, is "persistent, various, surprising, and whole-hearted" (5) and the feminine is associated with whatever outside the self is taken most seriously (6). Coppelia Kahn takes a combatting what it is now unfashionable to call false consciousness. Third, to interpret such works where possible 'against the grain', so as to appropriate from them whatever may be valuable for socialism. The practice of the socialist cultural worker, in brief, is projective, polemical and appropriative. (Eagleton 1981, 113)

Theatrical adaptation is not ever being faithful to that play. As Schecter asks, Isn't every new production an adaptation to some extent? There is no such thing as complete fidelity to the original. We can't recreate the Globe Theater and its actors (although Sam Wanamaker has wanted to do that for years). (5)
similar position: 

Shakespearean criticism has usually assumed that the plays present universal experiences equally true for men or for women... But much of their enduring value also lies in how they present specifically masculine experience. Today we are questioning the cultural definitions of sexual identity we have necessarily revolutionary or subversive. But theatrical adaptation could be used to carry forth this project: to participate in the production of a new work, polemicize against--if only by exclusion--whatever is reactionary in its 'source' text, and appropriate, "if necessary by hermeneutic 'violence'" (98), whatever can be of use in that text. This project would seem to be carried out in all three particulars in such a work as Ann-Marie MacDonald's Goodnight.

But this is not the fidelity that Bentley is after. Not fidelity to an unreconstructable original production, but to "say, the way a play has been staged for 50 years: a production that continues with a tradition, rather than breaking with one" (5). But what if, as in the case of Shakespeare throughout the 19th century, the tradition--as
inherited. I believe Shakespeare questioned them too, that he was critically aware of the masculine fantasies and fears that shaped his world, and of how they falsified both men and women. (Kahn 1981, 20)

Catherine Belsey and Jacqueline Rose take up a different position based upon utopian/subversive readings of Julia Kristeva and Jacques Lacan respec-

Desdemona (Goodmornin

With its practice of manipulating the text at the 'source,' adaptation is aligned with translation, which has been retheorized in a number of recent studies. The issues in current theorization of translation which relate to the theory and practice of adaptation are multiple: the attempt to articulate the place of translation in a general theory of textual manipulation; the displacement of a

Bentley alleges (and Peter Brook would assert even more strongly)—is based on misinterpretation and infidelity to the spirit of the work? What if the tradition is like the one at Yale Rep: an exclusion of the gay theme?

As to the question, what in the original is there to be faithful to, Bentley has a cluster of answers. There is the
tively. Belsey argues that Shakespeare disrupts sexual differences and points to a sexual (non)identity akin to that in Kristeva's third generation (post)feminism ("Disrupting Sexual Difference," 188-189). Rose, following her reading of Lacan in her introduction to *Feminine Sexuality*, reads Shakespeare's plays as transferring the question of woman and sexual identity to the level of language and subjectivity itself (Rose traditional and normative view of translation by an emphasis on seemingly marginal forms of translation; a subversion of the stability of the so-called source text by an emphasis on the translation processes at work within any text; a theorization of the play of fidelity and infidelity in any practice of translation; and, as might have been expected, a metaphorical/conceptual inflation of translation until it becomes seen as a quasi-universal form of effect of the original, which—we have already heard—can be recreated by infidelity to the author's stage directions.

How do we know what effect was originally intended? Once again, consensus, tradition, "'objective' facts." There is the substance of the original, Chekhov's inability to see factories coming, for instance. There is "the spirit of a
1985, 118), which points ultimately to "a different symbolic term" which would directly challenge the phallus (Rose 1982, 56). Finally (at least for the nonce), Kahn argues, in her review of Carol Thomas Neely's *Broken Nuptials in Shakespeare's Plays*--"the boldest, most tough-minded and meticulous feminist interpretation of the plays that has been written so far"--that Shakespeare "puts women into the same ideological crossfire in textual practice.

André Lefevere and Theo Hermans assert the need to place translation within the larger field of textual manipulation. Lefevere calls for a new paradigm which would recognize the importance of rewriting in all its forms, among them translation, to a much greater extent than the interpretation based paradigm could ever do, (Hermans, 222) and, according to Hermans, work" (6). Once again, these are subject to consensus, tradition, and "'objective' facts," which is to say, history and politics. Finally, most importantly, there is rhythm: when you start out with music you understand theater better. You understand that what is crucial in a temporal art is--no, not sound--but
which Renaissance women found themselves” (Kahn 1987, 371), so that no simple positioning of Shakespeare’s sexual politics is adequate.

What institutional function did the author or playwright or dramatist fulfil in Shakespeare’s time? Perhaps we will not be surprised to learn that for anyone writing for theatre Shakespeare’s was a "transitional era" (Cohen, 23): on the one hand the author (function) as we advocate

the integration of translation studies into the study of the many types of "rewriting" and "refraction" that shape a given culture. (14)

Hermans writes that this new paradigm of the literary "polysystem" would help us see “the relation between translation and other types of text processing,” and that The theory of the polysystem sees literary translation as

rhythm. A production comes alive when the right rhythm is found. When it is not found, then nothing is found. (7)

The interesting thing here is that, “when you translate for music, you take liberties with the text.” What is most crucial is what leads to adaptation, and adaptation leads to
know it did not exist, especially in the theatre: Shakespeare's theatrical career reveals no concern with authorial individuality or autonomy, no commitment to a stable text...the search for the true Shakespeare amounts to a modern rewriting, either a useful appropriation of the past for present needs or an ideologically variation: "My musical training led me to write lyrics [which weren't in the original]. Lyrics led me to write plays" (7).

Here we see how fidelity has slipped into adaptation, both because of the impossibility of fidelity which is inherent in the act of (re)interpretation and reconstruc-
misguided imposition
that effaces historical
difference.

(Cohen, 25)
The function of playwright
in Shakespeare's time is
part of another, earlier,
precapitalist heritage:
"the anonymous and multiple
authorship, oral perfor-
mance, and fluid texts of
the popular tradition"
(174). Bristol argues that
to see Renaissance theatre
as primarily a theatre of
the written word is
inaccurate: the stage is
paradigm. A theory of
adaptation, like a theory of
translation, turns away from
"unproductive essentialist
questions: how is translation
to be defined?, is transla-
tion actually possible?, what
is a "good" translation?"
(9), turns away from the
normative, prescriptive, and
transcendental to a "func-
tional view" (13) of a
cultural and political
practice in history: "all
translation implies a degree
of manipulation of the source
text for a certain purpose"

tion, and also by choice, because there was something either
to improve or to add, or a quarrel to work through: with
Brecht's Galileo, or Kleist's attitude to women (7).
Sometimes adaptations are made for the nonce, for instance
when an actor is too thin to be called an elephant (7).
When you go far enough, you end up with a variation, or what
not an empty or uncluttered space in which a message is disseminated without interference. On the contrary, it is already full of sound and of other socially significant semiotic material. (111)

The author function, which in the theatre owes much to Ben Jonson, is an attempt to limit and control the dispersion and subversion of authority (117):

Schechter calls (oxymoronically? tautologically?) a "free adaptation" (7): For them the new writer is not just translator or adaptor, he is playwright and must take the whole responsibility for the final result, including of course its faults. (8)
The subsequent success of the great Elizabethan playwrights and the prestige accorded to their work have made it difficult to appreciate the priority of a heteroglot theater. The theatrical performances that took place within this environment were created by means of a coalition strategy shared among writers. Susan Bassnett-McGuire writes, the written text is one code, one system in a complex set of codes that interact together in performance. The translator therefore has to work on a text that is, as Anne Ubersfeld defines it, *troué*, not complete in itself. And in creating a text for performance in the TL [target language], the translator necessarily...

But this is too cut and dry. There is always some of the original in the final result; the new writer can never take the whole responsibility. Such total escape from tradition is as impossible as total fidelity. But Bentley knows this too:

*In a Variation, then, one may try hard to*
and their texts, players and their repertoire of "business," and integral groups of spectators and their proverbs, jokes, curses and improvised commentary (123).

'Shakespeare's' theatre had no controlling individual (Weimann, 214). The playwright was "less esteemed than most readers of Shakespeare, Jonson, Ford, and Webster are likely to assume" (Bentley 1971, 43).

encounters an entirely different set of constraints in terms of TL conventions of stage production. (94)

Just as translation studies refuse to see translation outside of its cultural and social matrix, they refuse to see the translation of the dramatic text outside of theatrical (con)text. A theory of adaptation would have no problems with this. Against the normative practice of translation from one verbal language to

One doesn't just take off in other directions?

EB: One may take off in another direction and yet realize, along the way, that one is carrying more of the original than one had thought. (8)
Plays were meant to be acted, not read or published (51); playwrights tailored their material to the censors (196) and to the requirements of the company (76); they sold their work outright to the company (82), and "Far from being a sacred holograph, a dramatist's manuscript was often treated simply as another theatrical commodity" (87); new prologues (135), new scenes (138), new songs (139) would be added to old plays, often another, what Roman Jakobson calls "interlingual," or translation "proper" (Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel," 173; The Ear of the Other, 95), some recent translation studies stress heretofore marginal or improper practices: intralingual translation--which would help account for the textual (in the narrow sense) practices of theatrical adaptation: paraphrase, collage, abridgement; intersemiotic translation across sign systems, for instance from a linguistic or

The one who tries to be faithful is carrying more infidelity than (s)he knows; the one who tries to take off is carrying on unsuspected fidelities.

Two seemingly opposed concepts or practices, reconstruction and reinterpretation, are relevant to an understanding of adaptation. Reconstruction is the attempt to
by someone other than the author of the original:
any play first printed more than ten years after composition and known to have been kept in active repertory by the company which owned it is most likely to contain later revisions by the author or, in many cases, by another playwright working for the same company; (263)

verbal to a nonlinguistic or nonverbal system. Such a move comes close to wedding translation to the concept of intertextuality, which Kristeva defines as follows:

The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign systems into another ... every signifying practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an intertextuality), (Kristeva 1984,

recreate a past theatrical event; reinterpretation is theatrical production which imposes new meanings on old texts. Are these concepts or practices separate, even opposite, genres or are they names for different aspects of one activity?

Reconstruction was the subject of a special issue of
(this includes much of Shakespeare's work); collaboration was commonplace, accounting for perhaps half of all plays produced (199) (Sejanus was originally a collaboration and then rewritten by Jonson as the work of an 'author' (207); the Sejanus we have is an adaptation): Collaboration is inevitably a common expedient in such a cooperative enterprise as the production of a play...the although the "new signifying system may be produced with the same signifying material" (59). And so even interlingual translation is intersemiotic, intertextual; ultimately intralingual transpositions within the 'same' language (the production of a play, for instance) are intersemiotic, for any 'one' language is "never single, complete, and identical to [itself], but always plural, shattered" (60). Such an approach moves us away from a

The Drama Review in the Fall of 1984. There is a brief introduction to the volume by Michael Kirby. Kirby provides a definition of reconstruction as "Attempts to reconstruct or recreate performances that have passed into history" (2).

The first thing to note is the emphasis on performance rather than on dramatic text. Reconstruction assumes that
joint accomplishment of dramatists, actors, musicians, costumers, prompters (who made alterations in the original manuscript) and--at least in the later theatres--of managers. (198)

Finally, most studies tend to take Shakespeare's plays out of the theatres for which they were created and to analyze them in knowledge about the way drama is performed is vital to understanding, interpretation and appreciation. The second thing to note is the emphasis on history. Speaking of historical context, Kirby writes, "All art is an art of time" (2). Reconstruction, then, implies that a full understanding of drama must include an awareness of the material
the milieu of the lyric and philosophical poet and not in the milieu of the hardworking professional playwright devoted to the enterprise of the most successful and profitable London acting company of the time. (260)

But the Tribe of Ben was emerging. It was an "era in which a bourgeois belief in literary property was beginning to emerge and in

The polysemy, plurality, incompleteness of any semiotic system is at work within any one text, not only in the translation, but in the source text. In the introduction to Difference in Translation, Joseph F. Graham, commenting upon Richard Rand's attempt to show how Keats' "Ode to Autumn" is involved in the activity of translating itself, writes,

Because it is internal to a language, a text, and an author, this and historical details of its theatrical moment(s). This runs against naive views of Shakespeare--if anyone still holds such views--as not of an age, but for all time, as "our contemporary" where "our" applies indiscriminately to whatever age and situation "we" happen to be in (as opposed to the more discriminating sense of Shakespeare's contempor-

which dramatic composition already possessed a self consciously verbal dimension" (Cohen, 23). Perhaps Ben Jonson has been the most hegemonic and distorting of Shakespeare's readers: not only in his assertion that Shakespeare was "not of an age, but for all time," but in his legacy of our "modern suspicion of collaborative art" which reflects a bias in favour of bourgeois values like original-

example of translation changes the very notion of what is original or integral to every language, text, and author. With such translation, difference is already there in the original. (Graham, 21) In the same collection Barbara Johnson writes, "It is thus precisely the way in which the original is always already an impossible translation that renders translation impossible" (146). We could make this

aneity of Jan Kott), and also against a narrowly textual approach to Shakespeare, as if Shakespeare's plays, like Samson Agonistes, never were intended to the stage. These two emphases both make reconstruction potentially important for the theory and practice of theatre and theatrical adaptation. Reconstruction can help clarify, for instance,
ity, individuality, projection of personality, and aesthetic unity, a set of ideals, in short, that was rarely paramount in the public theaters.
(Cohen, 174)
Our imaginary pan shot has taken us from the nation and the city to the liberties and the institutional theatre and now comes upon the playhouse itself. We have already seen that Foucault’s clearer (?) by writing impossible as (im)possible.
for as Derrida writes in the same collection,
For if the structure of the original is marked by the requirement to be translated, it is that in laying down the law the original begins by indebting itself as well with regard to the translator. The original is the first debtor, the first petitioner; it begins by lacking and pleading in which complex ways Shakespeare is and is not our contemporary, a clarification which might be of great use to those who undertake an historically and theatrically informed adaptation of Shakespeare’s plays. However, the problems of reconstruction must be better understood, if it is not to become the vehicle of a naive and conservative theatrical
description of heterotopies could be applied to the Renaissance playhouse. We could elaborate on the application by adding several other points raised by Foucault. Firstly, heterotopies are both open and closed to the world around them, they are not completely open public places; secondly, they juxtapose several incompatible sites; thirdly, they are heterochronic, slices in time, often ephemeral; finally, they either expose for translation. (184)

Drawing, by analogy, upon all this, one might say of Henry V, as original, that it begins in a plural and shattering context, begins from a polysemous intertext, is not one within itself, begins by lacking and pleading for translation/reproduction/adaptation/understanding.

This plurality and derivativeness, this infidelity of the original to itself, undercuts any possibility of ultimate theory and practice.

Many of the naive and conservative tendencies of reconstruction can be seen in Ronald Watkins and Jeremy Lemmon's The Poet's Method, the introductory volume to their series of reconstructions of 'original' stagings of a number of Shakespeare's plays. They see their work as contributing
the folly of the world
around them or compensate,
with their idealism and
perfection, for the
imperfection of the world
(25-27).

The so-called public
theatre, as against the
private theatre in the city
proper, was both an open
public place, akin to the
carnival square, and a
private, closed, commercial
space, for which there was
an entrance fee, both
popular and protocapi-
talist, free and regulated.

Lefevere writes,
Translation operates
first of all under the
constraint of the
original, itself the
product of constraints
belonging to a certain
time...the universe of
discourse very often
poses insuperable
problems for any kind
of so-called 'faithful'
translation. (235)

Barbara Johnson writes,
For it is necessary to
be faithful to the
to an appreciation of Shakespeare's craft as dramatist and
playwright and opposing the longstanding "heresy" (14) that
Shakespeare was a great poet but "did not know how to make a
play" (15), that his "understanding of stagecraft, of
dramatic form, was rude" (14). They propose that

A reconstruction (as near as it can be made) of
On the popular side, it was related not only to the carnival square, but to theatre played in the open streets, and to the bear baiting arena (Nagler, 17); on the private and commercial side, the theatre was related to the closed courtyards of inns in which plays were staged for the profit of players and innkeepers (Thomson, 36)—the theatre in which Henry V was likely first performed, the Curtain, derived its name from the Italian

Shakespeare's plays in the conditions of his playhouse would, we believe, bring a clearer understanding of the nature of Shakespeare's dramatic craftsmanship. (17)

The first problem to raise is the blithely aestheticist appeal of this argument. Watkins and Lemmon are much more
cortina, meaning enclosure (Nagler, 5), a word not without historical significance in the privatization of public spaces. The theatre in this complex way bore the imprint of the past in its architecture just as it bore the imprint of medieval and classical theatre in its play structure. The Renaissance theatre, constructed of wood, easily dismantled (Thomson, 37), prone to fire, in its time a new and still evolving cultural unfaithful to the energy of the conflict as the tyranny of the swell-footed signified.

The opening chorus of Henry V seems a particularly blatant and acute admission of this discrepancy between letter and spirit, between representation and the imagined reality.

In the face of the impossibility of fidelity in any traditional sense, something new, a new kind of fidelity, a new kind of

interested in showing that Shakespeare’s plays are well-made than in illuminating the historical foundations of their meanings and functions. This objection opens onto a series of decisions made by Watkins and Lemmon in their paradigm of Shakespearean reconstruction. Robert K. Sarlos in his article on reconstruction in the special issue of The Drama
artifact (39), was ephemeral not only as an event, but as an architectural structure. We have already seen that Bristol and Dollimore, for instance, see the role of the theatre in exposing power and power relations in the surrounding world; Van den Berg, on the other hand, following the phenomenology of Bachelard, sees the playhouse form as an embodiment of the inner self, a place for thought and contemplation (23-24), intercourse, arises:

If the translator neither restitutes nor copies an original it is because the original lives on and transforms itself. The translation will truly be a moment in the growth of the original, which will complete itself in enlarging itself. ("Des Tours de Babel," 188)

This vision of the original becoming faithful to the translation, or the transla-

Review concedes that "no matter how purist a posture the historian assumes, it is impossible to abjure all interpretation" (4). Watkins and Lemmon are not totally unwilling to admit this:

Let us therefore try to propitiate opposition by limiting our aim. It should be stressed that our
of momentary escape from the real world to the "green world" (19) of subjective wholeness and self sufficiency (35). It may be that such an idea is played out as part of the ideological effect of this theatre, yet this idea hardly seems adequate as an explanation of the complex relations between the theatre and the world around it in Renaissance England.

Our gaze now enters the playhouse to study the translation as faithful to the translation latent in the original--to its intertextuality--with its spirit of cooperation between the original and the translation is only one way of mapping this play of fidelity. Lefevere speaks of translation as subversion relying on the authority of the original (238)--authorized transgression--which is a more overtly political and revolutionary view. As Lefevere writes, "this holds equally true for other forms

imaginary reconstruction is not designed as a 'definitive' production: there remain vast areas of latitude for difference in interpreting Shakespeare's intentions; in the process of making reconstructions, we have not seldom differed from each other in the dramatic interpretation of
audience within. Van den Berg stresses the individuality of members of the audience: a London audience was "a gathering of strangers" (39), of private individuals (65), not transplanted rural communities but uprooted and displaced persons. The stress on individualism receives support from Hill, who sees individualism as what Dekker called "City doctrine" (Hill, 27), and writes, "The phrase "the individual" in its modern of rewriting." A theory of adaptation follows a similarly heterogeneous and contestatory movement from fidelity and infidelity to what we might call (in)fidelity. There is, for instance, Brook's and Blau's and Dubois' sense of something before or inherent in Shakespeare, and yet not textual in the narrow sense, which the adapter is in alliance with/faithful to. There is the authorized transgression in the way that Goodnight Desdemona parades similar passages; sometimes these differences have indeed been insoluble even by compromise. Other critics...who have viewed Shakespeare's art in the context of his playhouse have differed in interpretation both general and particular from each other, and we from them. Such differences, far
sense dates from the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries" (40).

Weimann, although he argues that the popular tradition played a strong role in shaping Shakespeare's audience, argues that "the tradition began to make its greatest impact...at a time when its communal functions were growing steadily weaker" (178).

The contemplative aspect of the audience is stressed by Joel Altman who argues that an Elizabethan itself as "a comical Shakespearean romance."

Bassnett-McGuire comments upon fidelity in theatrical translation: Because of this multiplicity [of codes], any notion of there being a 'right' way to translate becomes nonsense, as does the whole question of defining 'translation' as distinct from 'version' or 'adaptation.' (101)

This reminds us of the from discrediting the method, demonstrate that it is not coldly categorical or restrictive. (19)

This liberalism vis-à-vis interpretation implies not only that reconstruction can be done in some interpretative vacuum, but that reconstruction is interpretatively disinterested, whereas on a much deeper level, their method
education in rhetoric stressed inquiry, contemplation, exploration and interrogation, and that plays were written and observed in this spirit (2-11): the freedom to pursue questions "released from the practical considerations of daily life" (389). We might add a note of caution here, that perhaps a majority of the audience was illiterate (Evans, 65) and had not received such a rhetorical education. Evans argues that literacy implies that certain interpretive decisions are not open to questioning, for instance the assumption that we are trying to get at "Shakespeare's intentions" ("Shakespeare knew very well what he was about" (19)) rather than uncover the heterogeneous intentionalities, contradictory and conflictual, in the historical moment of the first productions of importance of the contextual and nonverbal in theatrical translation as well as adaptation. It also brings us to the question of the inflation of translation as a totalizing concept and the conflation of differences. Barbara Johnson writes, Derrida's entire philosophic enterprise, indeed, can be seen as an analysis of the translation process at work in every text... the misfires, losses, and infelicities that
is a form of social control (83), and therefore the illiterate segment of the audience could not have been controlled in the same way as the literate. Thomson says that the audience was used to listening, and received much of its public information by ear (23). Weimann argues that the popular audience had a sophisticated and intelligent understanding of conventions (171), and even an alternative practice to formal rhetori-

prevent any given language from being one. (146)

So the name of différence, of writing, is now translation, and grammatology is to be translation studies. There is a certain amount of difficulty in resisting such a move, and translation studies pose it so forcefully that I think it important to address this question one more time. We have seen how intertextuality seems to be the same process as intersemiotic translation, and how these plays.

A decision has also been made by Watkins and Lemmon as to what is relevant to reconstruction, and their decision partakes of a technological and mechanistic bias perhaps inherent in the practice of reconstruction, although not necessarily in its theory. As Kirby writes,
cal training based on wordplay, nonsense, obscenity, riddle and misprision (134-150).

The audience, as we have seen, was "everyone" in London. [It is difficult to ascertain what classes attended in what numbers. Stephen Orgel doubts that members of the lower class could have very often afforded even the one penny admission (1975, 8). John Orrell’s reconstruction of the Globe presents a theatre in which, with a the (re)production of a play could be taken as just such a translation. Translation studies have much to offer a theory of translation, and as Graham writes, "Presumably it is no better to expand or contract the meaning of a word in principle, but only better or worse in practice for some specific reason" (22). Why do I object to the expansion of the concept of translation? Do I want to regenerify adaptation, translation, reading, etc., etc.? I would answer by

we do not believe that a performance can be completely re-created because we consider it to exist, ultimately, in the experience of the spectator, the historical context, the moment in time, parts of the experience that cannot be recaptured. (2)
capacity audience, less than a fifth of those in attendance were "groundlings" (137). The relations between the various members of the heterogeneous audience were stratified in any number of ways. The architecture of the playhouse was based upon a hierarchical scale of admission prices, from one penny (Thomson, 25-26) to stand in the pit to possibly as high as 12 pence for a box in the orchestra where a nobleman invoking another, not unrelated practice, the cinematic adaptation of the literary work. Is cinematic adaptation merely intersemiotic translation? It transposes text(s) from (one) semiotic system(s) to (an)other(s). And yet wouldn't it be better to afford it a certain degree of autonomy as a cultural practice? To do otherwise elides the institutional differences between the novelistic, the cinematic and the

This is not a position adopted by Watkins and Lemmon:

There is a fourth charge which must be treated seriously only because it is very commonly heard; that the reconstruction method will not work, because the audience is of the twentieth, not the sixteenth century, and we cannot reconstruct
could fuck while the show went on (Nagler, 108). Sumptuary laws (Hill, 49), physical appearance (59), manners, systems of deference would all have served to distinguish between classes.

Stroup argues that the "encompassing actions" of the plays set forth cosmic relations which bring together actors and audience (86). Weimann argues as well for a unity of actors and audience (30). On the other hand, film theory, Dudley Andrew argues, should drop adaptation and all studies of film and literature out of the realm of eternal principle and airy generalization, and onto the uneven but solid ground of Shakespeare's audience...Although the climate of opinion in the 1970s is unquestionably different, our concern is not with this change of climate, but with the theatrical tradition...and there is no doubt that this can be re-created. This re-creation certainly implies a demand upon the
as Bentley notes, we see artistic history, for the first time a practice, and discourse. (14)

professional theatre troupe in which the actors are not members of the community acting for the nonce.

Perhaps the ground is not so solid. But, between a totalizing definition which effaces differences and a set of definitions which reinstitute restrictive genres, we might continue to search out (a) shifting place(s) to stand.

Van den Berg stresses the passivity of the audience as opposed to earlier audiences (65). We see here the early stages of what Guy Debord calls the society of the spectacle, a historical phenomenon which reaches its apogee in the late capitalism of our own age, imagination...but it is absurd to suggest that the audiences of our time will be incapable of meeting it. (20)

I would argue that a wide-ranging study of historical contexts would reveal not only that it is absurd to suggest that the audiences of our time are informed enough to
in which passive consumers listen to the "monologue" (Debord, 18) of the spectacle (performed by the specialized and professional), in which alienated spectators are reunited as alienated, as "foules solitaires" (22), in which, as Baudrillard also says, the sign system, the appearance, the spectacle, have usurped the place of the 'real' (Debord, 12), and in which those caught in a debasing "pseudocyclical time" (126) come to recently theorized by Margaret Rose and Linda Hutcheon. In these theorizations there is a struggle over the definition of parody. Against a traditional and more narrow definition ("the critical quotation of performed literary language with comic effect"), Rose proposes one which is more general and inclusive ("the meta-fictional "mirror" to the process of composing and receiving literary texts" (59)). Hutcheon rejects the earlier imaginatively reconstruct them, but that in the long run the imagination, historically and ideologically trained, no matter how well informed, balks at the task. This conjunction of reconstruction and ahistoricism can also be seen in Watkins and Lemmon's recuperation of Shakespeare's "universality." They answer the objection that
passively witness the "time of adventure" (108) of great masters such as Henry V, thereby losing touch with truly historical, revolutionary time (133). If we live at the apogee or near the end of such a society, Shakespeare lived at its inception: these two moments are related, but not the same.

Particular considerations are due to women in the audience, and to the multiple structures which positioned them in ways limitation placed upon a definition of parody, that it is done "with comic effect" (Rose, 59), and argues for a more open "repetition with critical difference" (20), or "irony" (25). Parody moves from a somewhat marginal and specific practice to one almost without limits. Hutcheon's work begins with an epigram from Dwight MacDonald that "parody is the central expression of our times" (1).

If parody is the central expression of our times, it is because it partakes of the reconstruction takes away Shakespeare's universality and turns him into a museum piece not by countering that Shakespeare's universality is limited by his being of his age, but by questioning the universality of dressing the Roman patricians of CORIOLANUS in the uniforms of Nazi Germany, or converting THE
distinct from men of any class. There were women in the audience (Nagler, 107), but not on or back of the stage. The only position women are recorded as having held in the theatrical company is boxholder, the collector of admission from those entering the theatre (Bentley 1983, 94). In the production process of theatre women were limited to the role of spectators in Debord's sense. There is space, even in the role of "artistic recycling" (15), "trans-contextualizing" (11), and "refunctioning" which are characteristic of all art of our time (16). One limitation placed upon the scope of parody is that parody's target (source?) text is always another work of art (16). This distinguishes parody from a broader sense of intertextuality, which is not to be limited to "source studies." Parody can move toward the subversion of these limitations, however:

TEMPEST into a parable of colonial oppression, or finding a parallel between Hamlet's predicament and that of the student drop-out of today, or detecting in TWELFTH NIGHT overtones of the fashionable preoccupation with Unisex. (17-18)

Such contemporary restagings (which one would think are
spectator, for active participation in the theatrical event. Gerald Rabkin argues for the power of the theatrical audience to make and redirect meaning (156-157); in The Knight of the Burning Pestle we see a woman in the audience take up a strong part in controlling what happens in the theatre. But it seems most likely that such participation is only a male fantasy/nightmare—imagined by men, acted out by men—subversion" would seem to be Finnegans Wake, where in place of a single past work of art as source text, there is the intertext of western culture.

On the one hand parody is a distinct and particular praxis, in its narrowest sense the repetition with critical difference of a past work of art with comic effect; on the other hand parody, no longer limited by comic effect, is large enough to encompass, say, translation or adaptation or involved in a careful measuring of Shakespeare's universality) distort, obscure, and limit Shakespeare's world, "which is concerned less with a particular war, a particular social issue, a particular psychological problem, than with the human condition itself" (18). The "human condition itself" and Shakespeare's concern with this condition are taken by
and it remains doubtful that such a strategy of intrusion was practically available to women in the audience.

The theatre did not exclude women from its audience; in its own way it addressed them: there were 'women's genres,' such as romantic comedy (Gurr, 137). There may be some useful parallels to be drawn between Renaissance plays thought to appeal to women and the so-called "woman's film" of tradi-

rereading, and, indeed, in the case of a limit text such as Finnegans Wake, no longer limited by a source text, it expands until it becomes synonymous with literary—if not contextual—intertextual-ity, the central expression of our times.

This expanded definition of parody threatens to swallow adaptation as a (semi)autonomous practice. The specific limitation of having another work of art as source holds for adaptation as well. Like parody,

Watkin and Lemmon to be givens, not as ideological constructs and assertions. We should remind ourselves here that reconstruction does not impose limitations on the interpretation of Shakespeare's work.

[The same cultural politics are taken up in a recent editorial (next to an editorial advocating the ratification
tional cinema. Mary Ann Doane shows how these films are structured on the contradiction between the attempt to address a female spectator and the male voyeurism and fetishism which structures all traditional cinema, whereby woman can only be an object, not a spectator (69). In her influential article "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," Laura Mulvey traces the contradiction between the male gaze and the exposing adaptation has a relation to (a) specific source text(s) which sets it apart from an intertextuality without reserve—as Dudley Andrew writes of (cinematic) adaptation:

Adaptation delimits representation by insisting on the cultural status of the model, on its existence in the mode of text or the already textualized. In the case of those texts which are explicitly termed

of the Meech Lake accord) in the *Globe & Mail*, "Troilus and Cressida in spacesuits." Modernizing Shakespeare is ridiculed through a number of short Shakespearean parodies—paradoxically serving the cause of fidelity, a fidelity whose nature is taken for granted and unquestioned. The editorial concludes as follows:
of this gaze which lies at the heart of traditional cinema (17). In Renaissance theatre what might have functioned in a way analogous to the male gaze is the use of male actors to play the women's parts; like the male gaze the use of boy actors posits a masculine "idea of woman" (6) in the place of the representation of women by women. To carry this analogy one step further, it might be that the effect of 'vertigo' (16) which "adaptations," the cultural model which the cinema represents is already treasured as a representation in another system. (9)

The anomalous case of something like Hamletmachine, in which the source texts are so multiplied as to move towards a fuller intertextuality, would be analogous to the example of Finnegans Wake. Parody in a narrow sense is at use in the iambic pentameter, lexical play and tonal irony of Ann Marie

The idea in all this [modernization] is to prove that Shakespeare's writings are universal, that the characters and motivations ring true no matter what their epoch, and that references to the twentieth century will help modern playgoers to a deeper understanding of the plays. Plus, if you
comes in cinema with exposing the male gaze was achieved in Renaissance theatre by exposing the gender of the actors playing women’s parts. Catherine Belsey has discussed the disruptive effect that this play of gender has in Twelfth Night and As You Like It. And yet, once again the question remains as to whether these contradictions and instabilities allowed for any actual subversive positioning to MacDonald’s Goodnight Desdemona (Goodmorniq In Juliet), and in the recycling of mistaken identity, ironic reversal, love at first sight, and other conventions of Shakespearean comedy; we might even see this transformation of Shakespeare’s tragedies into feminist comedy as a "supersession" of the target text, which is part of the parodic balance (Rose, 35); finally we might see the entire play as a "trans-contextualizing" of Shakespearean romance, its tried it on a modern playwright he’d [sic] sue your pants off.

The editorial argues that modernization serves an ideal of naive and misguided universalization; but that ideal is really being served by the editorial itself, which fails to question the limits of Shakespeare’s universality, which
be taken up by women in the audience: as Doane writes of the "woman’s film," it functions—if in necessarily a rather complex way—"to deny the woman the space of a reading" (80). By denying women access to the theatrical representation of themselves, Renaissance theatre limited women’s ability to respond to and help (re)construct theatre even more than it limited the audience as a whole. Catherine Belsey argues that this institutionalization, even if as an attempt to recuperate universality, faces much more squarely. Adaptations quite often are recognitions that Shakespeare’s work is historical rather than universal. The Globe’s editorialist(s) call(s) upon history in the last line of the piece to invoke that contemporary playwright who has every right to sue those who
tionalized silence kept women from being installed as subjects (The Subject of Tragedy, 220-221), or that women were and were not subjects (150). There is a continuing need to explore the complexity of a subject position based primarily on being seen and not heard, or on having imposters speak in your place. The question which remains is whether women had any leeway for subversive or resistant response in the way that Weimann and with, contains within itself, a critical reading of Shakespeare. The critical function of parody gives to it a metafictional or self-reflexive quality, which is equally discernable in the play of theory and practice in the adaptations of Blau, for instance.

It would be possible, therefore, to recategorize the works I call theatrical adaptations as a kind of parody, and to subsume adaptation as a practice under a generalized practice

...infringe upon 'his' property, 'his' authorial intention. The inference is that Shakespeare, although legally lacking that right, is entitled to it--some rights are universal--both morally and as a matter of artistic taste. Modernization and adaptation are condemned in the name of transhistorical property rights.
Bristol, for instance, allow for a subversive and resistant popular response. The complexity and diversity of the theatre audience sets up complex conditions of reception which have not always been --perhaps never can be-- adequately dealt with in attempts to ascertain the effect of a play like Henry V. In "Shakespeare's Politics," L. C. Knights appeals to an organicist, national, transhistorical "we" in order to assert the of parody. To do so, however, would be to elide certain differences. Hutchison herself cautions against too broad a use of the term parody. Parody is not "an infinitely expandable modern paradigm of fictionality or textuality" (109). Because of its complex determinants parody "can call into question the temptation toward the monolithic in modern theory," and "many perspectives help us understand this pervasive modern phenomenon [the "refunc-

Besides a certain ahistoricism, Watkins and Lemmon reveal their (un)disguised disrespect for contemporary adaptation. "Nor do we wish to be understood as declaring that Shakespeare's intended way is the only way to perform Shakespeare" (19), they write, and yet we read of distortion, obscurity, limitation, heresy, an "alien tradition"
play's support for "living order" (236):

We are inevitably prompted to a clearer recognition of the fact that a wholesome political order is not something arbitrary and imposed, but an expression of relationships between particular persons within an organic society. (237)

I don't wish to argue that Shakespeare's theatre was

tioning" characteristic of all art of our time], but none is sufficient in itself" (116). Parody cannot have a transhistorical definition (10), and any detailed understanding of parody must see it as a practice which changes through history--Hutcheon's "so-called 'theory' of parody is derived from the teachings of the texts themselves, rather than from any theoretical structure imposed from without" (116). In the 19th century, parody usually served a

(16). Adaptation must be some kind of pharmakon when it is a poisonous practice in which the plays are perversely "remade or modified to suit the new conditions" (16), and yet "the variations played upon them in the theatre are... expressions of creative vitality; and the response of the plays themselves to eccentric treatment is a sign of their
incapable of appealing to and eliciting such a response—Andrew Gurr sees such a common response, a mass emotion, elicited in 1 Henry IV (135). And yet at the same time Gurr sees the 1590s as a period in which, despite any common appeals, theatre and its attractions were strongly demarcated by gender (137). A. C. Sprague argues that the intention and effect of Henry V are perfectly straightforward, and to do so appeals to no inter-
conservative function: the ridiculing of the new (a function still served by parody in the Globe and Mail editorial on "Troilus and Cressida in spacesuits"). In the 20th century parody also serves more complex and ambiguous functions; there is at the heart of parody a paradox: "The dual drives of conservative and revolutionary forces that are inherent in its nature as authorized transgression" (26). Therefore "parody can be a revolutionary position; the continuing life" (13). Which is it? Watkins and Lemmon's reconstructive project seems to indicate that they are firmly entrenched in opposition to Troilus and Cressida in spacesuits. Against this view we should set the very different position taken by Kirby: Because reconstruction, theoretically, is guided
preter or audience other than Shakespeare himself (199), which of course is an ahistorical imposition of the author function. In our own day Ralph Berry argues that Henry's success overrides any reservation or doubt about his character, and that this is clear from a "general impression in performance" (1988, 87-88), without making clear whether this is a general impression he has gathered from the limited number of performances he has seen, by standards other than contemporary taste, it offers us the possibility of something unexpected, surprising and radically different. When this happens, when looking toward the past creates a new view of the future, reconstruction fulfills the goals of the avant-garde. (2)
or the collective impression of everyone present (how would one discover this?) at a performance or all performances Berry has seen, or all performances imaginable. Norman Rabkin sees Henry V as "capable of being read [sic] as two different plays" (43), and appeals to "Shakespeare's best audience"—which seems to be the contemplative Elizabethan individuals discussed by van den Berg and Altmann, or their 20th century descendants (who, texts. While I think it naive to assume that one can begin merely from practice, since theory will have already informed both the practice and the observation whether we will or (k)no(w), my theorization of adaptation has been spurred by an encounter with already existing texts, and my theorization is an attempt to generalize from/with the specificity of these texts and to 'remain faithful' to their specific praxis. In several ways, contemporary Sarlos takes a similar position. He is convinced "that to break new ground, practitioners must become familiar with the work of preceding artists" (3), and "They would not have the slightest desire to duplicate what they had seen—but just to have seen it would be a boon" (5). Reconstruction and reinterpretation need not be at cross purposes.
for some reason, haven't always read the play as Rabkin does)--to perform this reading. Alexander Leggatt writes that, "A full reception of the play demands both engagement and questioning" (124), and it is up to "us"--whoever we are--"to make of it what we can" (125). Graham Holderness resorts to "complex unity" (68) acting on "the spectator" (73). Catherine Belsey's important work is marred by the assumption that, "A adaptations of Shakespeare seems a richer and more characteristic classification for these specific works than parody would be.

Whereas adaptation defines a process without a necessary beginning or end, parody, like offshoot or derivation, implies--at least in its etymology--a movement from original to imitation: from ode to parody. Ode and parody are literary, or dramatic, terms, even if parody is no longer conceived of as a strictly literary

One of the reasons for Watkin and Lemmon's distrust of modifying Shakespeare's plays is that their theatrical reconstruction ultimately leads them to believe, paradoxically, that what counts most is the dramatic text. Shakespeare's plays "were designed as poetic drama; that is, drama in which language is the chief instrument for the
specific text proffers a specific subject-position from which it is most readily intelligible" (Subject of Tragedy, 6), and by appeals to a homogeneous "spectator" (26, 29, 33), and therefore by a too simplistic notion of "an audience" (30). And yet some critical work has begun to open onto the complexities of reception. Leonard Tennenhouse, while not specifically concerned with the heterogeneity of the audience, is open to activity; the concept of adaptation is, in a way particularly important to the heterogeneity of theatre, much less tied to literary, or dramatic, practice. Adaptation stresses the context of "rewriting" to a degree which parody does not. For Hutcheon parody is a textual practice in the narrow sense: if parody "trans-contextualizes" past works of art, the new context is merely the new work of art, and the very contextuality of this new text is not creation of dramatic illusion" (17). Their main interest in reconstructing Shakespeare's playhouse is to posit its non-theatricality: the limited theatrical means at Shakespeare's disposal allowed "the finest dramatic poetry of our language" (18) to speak without encumbrance. This reveals a lack of appreciation of Shakespeare's theatricality, on
the complex and highly historically specific negotiations of meaning in Shakespeare’s history plays (99), while Dollimore and Sinfield argue that "the question of conviction is finally a question about the diverse conditions of reception" (109). An investigation of these diverse conditions of reception would need to look at (reconstruct) not only the unity or ambivalence of response in any socially and historically a primary issue (109). In theatrical adaptation the importance of context is a primary issue. Adaptations in the theatre are not just a matter of literary imitation, of verbal or even formal repetition with critical difference, but of struggling with and restructuring context: audiences, playing spaces, economies.

Finally, I would want to make fine distinctions between the political efficacy of parody and adaptation--although parody, Watkin and Lemmon’s part, equal to their lack of appreciation of the importance of the historical situation.

We see, then, in The Poet’s [sic] Method (that is, the author’s intentions) a gutting of the importance of reconstruction: rather than a historical and contextual theatricality against which we can weigh the present, there is a
specific spectator, but at the possibilities of common responses and divergent responses in a heterogeneous audience over the course of a performance or at performances under different circumstances.

As our cognitive camera moves toward the stage, we begin to see how not only the audience but the playing space itself was heterogeneously structured. Stroup points out the cosmic arrangement—the trap door leading to "hell" any more than adaptation, is not a monolithic political practice. Ian Sowton notes that "authorized transgression" would be an apt label for the practice of Renaissance drama as understood by the new historicists. He asks, therefore, if this drama is parodic? Rather than answer yes or no to this question, I would call for an finer understanding of the various possible meanings of "authorized transgression": from transgression used by the authorities for the sake universal dramatic text which scoffs at present contingencies. At the same time there is an extreme valorization of reconstruction at the expense of adaptation and reinterpretation, although we have seen in Kirby and Sarlos that reconstruction need not take such an adversarial position to the unexpected, surprising, and radically different. I want
below, the scaffold itself as earth, and the upper reaches or "heavens" (32)—which creates a space for everyman, or at least for Weimann’s "everyone" addressed by the theatre. However, at the same time that a cosmic space was shaped for a unified, undifferentiated humankind, the playing space, like the space of the audience, was stratified, classified, and demarcated. Van den Berg argues that while the playhouse is derived from of its containment to authority used by transgressors for the sake of its subversion. I would argue that adaptation, at least as a concept, entails more possibility for transgression and transformation than parody does/has. This is not to say that parody cannot be subversive or transgressive: as Rose writes, When meta-language also has the function of undermining rather than perpetuating authorities (whether institu-

to explore this relation more fully, starting with a passage in Sarlos:

Recapturing the spirit of the Shakespearean staging tradition has been the aim of artists and scholars from William Poel and Frank Benson to Sir Tyrone Guthrie and Peter Brook. There is, of
the popular arena—although we have seen that it has a more complex derivation than that—the stage itself is derived from the private, even aristocratic, enclosed court (46). Weimann shows that the stage itself is dual: the upper stage, or locus, was distant, hierarchical, representational, aristocratic; the downstage area, closer to the audience, the platea, was transgressive, nonrepresentational, and plebeian (73–79)—the place Nor is it to say that adaptation does not share parody’s ambiguity as a method of liberation (Rose, 187). I am speaking only of a change of emphasis, a radical emphasis on change rather than an emphasis on the source text, an emphasis on transformation rather than on containment: adaptation need not be revolutionary.

course, a world of difference between rebuilding "The Globe" in Detroit or London and Brook’s revivals of some 20 years ago. But they have in common the desire to find the original dynamic.

(6)

(Is it so strange that the texts I have been exploring in
of asides, bawdiness, and wordplay. How strictly this topography was adhered to in performance we can never know, but this distinction helps to localize the tension Van den Berg speaks of when he says that the actors both share a space with the audience and are set apart from it (51). This distinction would also help us to understand the specifics of Shakespearean "spectacle"—that is, to what extent and in what the point is that it can be (Is this an adaptation or a parody?).

I want to change directions at this point and turn from practices which have affinities with adaptation to look at the positions adaptation—and related practices—take up vis-à-vis certain cultural, institutional apparatuses which have heretofore functioned in the interest of the hegemonic order, linchpins of what Theo Hermans calls the old paradigm (7): genre, author, these pages release to me phrases which seem appropriate far beyond what appears to be their original intent? This time the phrase is "a world of difference." For that is what I am attempting to map here: a world of difference in which I can place such seeming opposites as reconstruction and reinterpretation.)
manner the audience did and did not take up a passive role before the event/commodity which was set apart from and in the midst of them: would the groundlings have been more free to address an actor making asides in the platea than an actor upstage who made no direct address to them?

We are now looking at the structured but empty stage. We have come to that moment in the text designated by, "Enter Prologue": an actor steps canon.

We might begin with the traditional yet not particularly restrictive theory of genre articulated by Rosalie Colie in her work on genre in the Renaissance and in Shakespeare's work. Colie has a strong sense of the problematics of genre: despite attempts to fix genres "hard," "it was not entirely obvious in the Renaissance what the genres of literature surely were, nor yet how to identify them" (1973, 9). She is interested

Sarlos has here laid the groundwork for an understanding of the way reconstruction in the narrow, mechanical sense is part of a larger practice of recreation or reinterpretation. Firstly, as we have seen, he admits that interpretation always enters into any act of reconstruction; secondly he argues that acts of reinterpretation, such as
onto that stage. What can we say about the presence of that actor? First, he is male, even if the character played is a woman or girl. This is one of those commonplaces which it is impossible for us to adequately digest. How did this seem? How did it affect the representation of 'female' characters? Certainly the effect was not like what it would be if today Shakespeare were played by an all-male cast. G. B. Shand, who directed in "the ways in which a genre-system can maintain and also subvert its own rules" (27) just as Shakespeare was interested in genre's problematic nature, not its stereotypical force (1974, 15). In Colie's genre theory, the writer is seen to generate work by rewriting accepted limits and practices, is seen to use, misuse, criticize, recreate, and sometimes revolutionize "received topics and devices" (3). However, there remains in Colie's theory a prioriza-

Brook's, are reconstructive in that they are attempts to recapture the spirit or "the original dynamic" of the Shakespearean staging. The differences between reconstruction, adaptation, and reinterpretation have to do with explicit and implicit assumptions as to what elements of "the original dynamic" must be recaptured and what elements
an all-male Doctor Faustus, told me that today an all male cast cannot avoid seeming homosexual. In a tradition of boy actors, would the issue of homosexuality have been less acute, and would the illusion of heterosexuality have been as convincing as it would be if women acted? We cannot reconstruct the conventionality involved. And yet the antitheatrical prejudice of the day, which was strong enough to contribute to the closing
tion of genre over its transgression. For Colie genre comes before transgression (1974, 14; 1973, 26).

Transgression is always authorized by genre, is only possible against preestablished genre. However, the subversive power of adaptation as a concept begins with the notion that there is no source or stem for which the adaptation is tributary or offshoot. The decision, therefore, to give priority to genre over transgression, if adopted as a model for the

are expendable. Brook, of course, has no use for strict reconstruction: for him "faithful reconstructions" are only of "antiquarian interest" (The Empty Stage, 16), and are linked to the "deadly" nineteenth century tradition.

Sarlos, however, although he sees his work as an advance in theatrical museology (5), wants to "resurrect" (6) pieces of
of the theatres, saw in male actors dressed in women's clothing an indication of effeminization (Levine, 123), hermaphrodisim (130), and homosexuality (134). The play of cross dressing in *As You Like It* and *Twelfth Night* carries with it a frisson which argues against a complete normalization of the practice. On the other hand, how much does the sex of the actor matter when the task is to represent a patriarchal image of a relation of adaptation to genre, would instill at the heart of adaptation theory a priority to the status quo which would conceptually limit or even weaken the subversive potential of adaptation.

There is a very different theorization of genre in Derrida's "The Law of Genre." Genre is the systematization of exclusion and inclusion, a systematization subject to reversal and displacement. In "The Law of Genre" Derrida lays down the "norms and theatrical history. This means that "all collaborators must enter into the spirit of the enterprise" (8). What we see here is that the reconstructionist and the reinterpreter see their tasks in the same terms: to recapture a life and spirit which is somehow inherent in certain aspects of the historical moment but not in others; in some things we must
woman? The woman who could succeed at this would perhaps bring no more to the role than would a female impersonator. If the task, however, were to expose this limitation, or to transgress it, either in Shakespeare's time or our own, how would the sex or sexuality of the actor enter into this? Could a woman bring all of herself, her difference, to the acting of Shakespeare without radically reinterpreting her role? interdictions" (203) which are the raison d'être of genre: "Genres are not to be mixed"; "I will not mix genres" (202). He then "abandon[s] [these utterances] to their fate." Their fate is the law of genre: "interpretive options" which are "legion" (202); a law "which is more or less autonomous in its movements" (227); a law which is "in the feminine" (225), much in the same way that (masculine) sexuality is given the lie, exposed by its reliance upon be faithful, in others we can afford to be unfaithful.

In his introduction to the "Reinterpretation Issue" of The Drama Review (Summer 1981), Michael Kirby begins by explaining why the issue is not to be called "Radical Interpretation": "At what point, our contributors wanted to know, did an interpretation become radical?" (2) He maps
The actor is an individual among individuals. In this case, we don't know which individual. Baldwin does not conjecture which member of the Lord Chamberlain's men spoke the choruses in *Henry V*. Does it matter? Weimann says that the chorus speaks as the voice of the citizen audience (9): he is "everyone," everyman. Van den Berg sees the actor as the central, unifying individual (27)—in Althusser's terminology, the Subject feminine sexuality (Jacqueline Rose, 44). Much as representation is the establishment of systematic identities and non-identities which is undercut by the disclosure of the free play in representation itself, genre is undercut by the disclosure of free play as the law of genre.

To abandon genre to its fate, a fate which it holds as part of "an historico-metaphysical epoch" (Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 4) and which is being announced "at a

out what he calls "the interpretation continuum": at one end are plays staged in the commonly expected way—traditionally as Brook or Bentley would say; at the other end are "productions in which the original script can hardly be recognized." Such so-called radical interpretations are not widespread today, so that by "reinterpretation" Kirby means
with a capital S (167). The Subject with a capital S, in Althusser's example, is the Christian Name-of-the-Father, but Lacan's *nom* or *non du père* would relate this Subject to patriarchy, and, in absolutist England, the Subject is also related to the centrality, capital-ly speaking, of the monarch. We may, then, not want to speak of a unified Subjectivity, but of a hegemonically co-ordinated Subjectivity. The actor is analogous to the king, his distance of a few centuries (8), is to abandon it to reversals and displacements. The ultimate task of the agent of this fate is not to reaffirm what metaphysics targets, but to reinscribe metaphysical and rhetorical schema otherwise (Derrida, "White Mythology," 215), with the result that "no rigorous definition of anything is ultimately possible" (Spivak 1987, 77), including "the concepts of gender, race, and class" (84), and that there can be, for instance, no not only the most radical interpretations, but "productions...that re-interpret well-known scripts in ways that are more or less radical and unexpected." What is missing from this mapping of the "interpretation continuum" is radical interpretation in another sense. Radical comes from the Latin word for root and can mean a return to origins or
mirror image. But he is also a negation, or reversal. The king brings two bodies to his performances: a body natural, like "everyone"'s, weak and fallible, and a body politic, unique, divine, beyond question (Kantorowicz, 7). The actor too has two bodies: in Hobbes's words, a Naturall Person, a body natural, and a "Feigned or Artificiall person" (Hobbes, 217). While the king's body natural is backed by the "establishment of a hegemonic 'global theory' of feminism" (84). Deconstructive displacement aims towards a genre, a feminism, etc., 'without reserve,' the "affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming" (Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play," 292). Such a notion of a law of genre without reserve could be aligned with notions of textuality without limit, intertextuality, and with adaptation conceived of as an inescapable process of first principles—as in reconstruction. "Radical Interpretation" would indeed be a fine name for an issue of The Drama Review, but that issue would have to come to grips with the "common thread" (Sarlos, 6) that runs between a "radical and reactionary" (Watkins and Lemmon, 19) practice and a radical practice which uses "the script as a vehicle
metaphysical fullness of the body politic, the actor’s natural person is masked by a Subjectivity—
with a capital S—of dissemblance.

The actor’s role as Subject with a capital S also disguises the particularity of his individuality and of the diverse factions of the audience, including the separation of the individuals present into actors and audience. Just as the audience is divided into classes (and genders), recontextualization. It undermines the idea of genre as (a valorization of) the status quo, in the same way that adaptation without reserve undermines the idea of source or original as prior to adaptation.

One wonders, however, how much use an idea of the fate of certain concepts is to a politicized theory: how can we move from the fate of genre to the politics of genre? Derrida has written, Our interpretations will not be readings of to say something quite different from what the playwright intended” (Kirby 1981, 2), and with the complex ways in which reaction and innovation are never quite separate: (re)interpretation is always at work.

It is time, I think, to attempt a preliminary sketch of this “interpretation continuum,” this “common thread” that
the company is divided into sharers and hired men, protocapitalists and workers. One would suspect that such a substantial role as that of the chorus in Henry V went to one of the sharers of the company, since hired men tended to be used only in small parts (Bentley 1984, 66). So we see that this exemplary individual, the voice of "everyone," was actually the voice of a male sharer in the company, and by no means a woman's voice, or a hermeneutic or exegetic sort, but rather political interventions in the political rewriting of the text and its destinations. (Ear of the Other, 32)

The deconstruction of traditional hierarchies—genre/anomaly, original/adaptation—does seem an important aspect of (the theorization of) (political) subversion. And yet it leaves much work to be done. Spivak has expressed dissatisfaction is at work, explicitly or implicitly, with acceptance or denial, in the accounts of adaptation, offshoots, variations, reconstructions, and reinterpretations that we have been examining. Figure 1 is this preliminary sketch.
hired man’s voice, or the voice of someone from the audience.

And now the voice speaks: "O For a Muse of Fire..." But we have to raise a few more points before we can hear this speech. Let us pass over quickly the sources for 'Shakespeare's' play, Holinshed, Tacitus, The Famous Victories; let us pass over the general intertextuality which calls into question any possibility of 'originality'; let with Derrida's (apparent) political neutrality:

I would wish that Derrida might take a strategically asymmetrical stand with the neutralizing complicity discourse of deconstruction...It would be much more important and to the point to follow the ethico-economic agenda that operates the oppositions.

(1984, 189)

She also writes, "I am still moved by the reversal-dis-
us pass over the signs of incomplete revision which place the text in process and apart from any original perfection. But there are a few points to be made about the Prologue itself. The speech is in the 1623 folio, but not in any quartos. Taylor concludes that the first quarto, which served as copy for subsequent quartos, is a memorial reconstruction of an abridgement made for the Lord Chamberlain's men, presumably by Shakespeare, placement morphology of deconstruction, crediting the asymmetry of the 'interest' of the historical moment" (84).

I take this to mean that the movement from reversal to displacement is not teleological but strategic. In the political short term--the next few centuries--much struggle is to be waged on the level of reversal. And so, a theory of adaptation and related practices must be open to a heterogeneous engagement with genre.

Firstly, the placement of terms or genre distinctions along the broken line (broken to (re)present a certain discontinuity) is highly tentative; it is doubtful that more careful thought would ever come up with exact positions: only a model in many more dimensions could begin to do this. On the other hand to be more exact would to some extent be...
within a year of the first performance of the play in 1599, for use by a touring company of eleven actors (Wells and Taylor, 109-110). If this is the case, there are two points to note: Shakespeare himself entered into the act of adaptation of *Henry V* within a year of its composition—an adaptation that Taylor thinks "possibly improved" the play (111), and in that adaptation, the choruses were taken to be, in Taylor's Margaret Rose writes of parody's transformation of one genre into another (34); Ann-Marie MacDonald, struggling against the very issue of fate, rewrites *Romeo and Juliet* and *Othello* as comical romance, and Charles Marowitz rewrites *Measure for Measure* as a Brechtian Lehrstück. In *Hamletmachine* Müller works towards a "radical version of the Brechtian Lehrstück" (Teroaka, 30), a displacement or reinscription, which leads towards the emergence of an anomalous case (Compagnon, to enforce the distinctiveness of these 'genres,' whereas the (dis)continuum is meant to reveal the slippage between them.

Secondly, in recalling the way reconstruction and unexpected reinterpretation meet in the word "radical," we might want to see that the two ends of the (dis)continuum
word, "dispensable" (77)--we might say marginal, somehow within and outside the play at once. There is a more drastic position, taken by W. D. Smith and later G. P. Jones, that the choruses themselves are a later adaptation of the original work, possibly by someone other than Shakespeare, possibly for a performance at court (Wells and Taylor, 77-78n; Riverside Shakespeare, 53, 930), arguments which Taylor finds "exception-

11), moving from genre to monstrosity, towards "the species of the nonspecies" (Derrida 1978, 293) [this dissertation moves in the direction of the monstrosity]. Linda Hutcheon argues that parody in its extended form is probably a genre (19). In the (not so distant) past, parody, as well as adaptation, have been seen as devalued genres, parasitic and derivative (3), peripheral and always found wanting vis-à-vis the original (Hermans, 8). Part come together: what is the other but something new, a new original; what was the original but a new other? This would allow us to rewrite the (dis)continuum as a circle, as in Figure 2.
of the strategy of theories of parody and adaptation is to assert their centrality as genres, their status as arche-genres, so that those genres which purport to be nonparasitic and nonderivative are exposed as parody or adaptation in disguise.

Margaret Rose, on the other hand, sees the ambivalence of parody as a "norm" (188). When we have attempted to define or genrify parody or adapta-

- Original/Other
- Adaptation

Figure 2 advances three important arguments. Firstly, it shows that adaptation can be seen as the part of the circle which is furthest away from the (idea of the) original and the other. Secondly, we have

able." If, however, we are not looking at an adaptation or the work of an "author" other than Shakespeare, we might at least want to consider the difference between these lines spoken in the public playhouse and in a private playhouse or at court. Also we might wonder, besides the logistics of doubling, if there was something about these lines which would make them unsuitable for a tour to the provinces outside London (where perhaps it was more appropriate to
tion we have found ourselves caught between conceptual explosions which erase all distinctions and exclusions which reduce parody and adaptation to genres, minor genres at that, which is what they were taken to be before we began. The problem of genre is to some extent the problem of definition, and the law of genre is another name for what claims to underpin/undermine all our already seen how adaptation joins the original and the other as its limiting instances; thus in Figure 2 "Adaptation," at the bottom of the circle, could be taken as the name of circle, as the designation of what the entire figure represents. Thirdly, by drawing the circle the way I have, I stress the traditional valorization of the original and the other over adapta-
tion. We have seen this speak simply and boldly for the representation of centralized power rather than humbly within the complex stratifications of that centralized representation; also, if individualism was still city doctrine, was the "I" of the Chorus appropriate for the provinces?--or for that matter on a English Shakespeare Company tour to Toronto in 1987? Now at last we can read the first lines of the play. But we can only do a selective reading, and we must ignore a
conceptualizations.

Equally, the law of genre is behind the intertwining of (the genre of) theory and (the genre of) practice that we see in parody, in adaptation, in this dissertation. In the words of Derrida, we live absolutely irreconcilable interpretations simultaneously, "and reconcile them in an obscure economy" (1978, 293); in the words of Teresa de Lauretis, we continually: for Ruby Cohn, "Shakespeare offshoots are not Shakespeare" and yet transformation, not adaptation, is the "brightest heaven of invention"; for Bentley, adaptation is fidelity manqué, and yet he "can see the point of view of someone who says nothing is sacred, and uses the material the way Brecht used The Beggar's Opera" (4)—to make "A new play" (5). Even Gerald Rabkin seems to do great deal. The first thing I want to ignore, or at least marginalize, is the "discursive reasoning" of the passage. The phrase comes from Altman, who speaks of the "faith of [Elizabethan] culture in the power of discursive reasoning" (395). The speech we are looking at has a discursive reasonableness, a rhetorical finish, an aristocratic civility, a persuasiveness (all of which we might call, after Heiner Müller, "BLABLA" (*Hamletmachine*, 53)), which is
live the contradiction (26). In translation studies Derrida tells us that there is a complicity of the seemingly translatable text with the seemingly untranslatable one (Ear of the Other, 117-118n), although Graham argues that it may be necessary to maintain distinctions which deconstruction has already called into question in order to explain the practice of translation something of this implicitly in his comparison of the Wooster Group's L.S.D. (which used Arthur Miller's The Crucible to make "a new work" (144)) and ART's Endgame. The Wooster Group, with its variation, free adaptation, transformation, radical and unexpected reinterpretation, "not only deprivileges the play while respecting its contribution, it explicitly challenges the identity of text with written text" usually taken as its meaning: this is the version of the text which is reconstructed in, for instance, the footnotes in the Arden or Riverside editions. The editors take pains to explain the crooked figures and ciphers, or in the Arden edition that "proud" in line 27 means spirited, and is a term "frequently used of a horse." Our analysis will reconstruct a different version of the speech, a version in which the smooth flow of persuasion rubs against heterogen-
Spivak writes of "the irreducible non-fit between theory and practice" (1987, 175), and so asserts that the political subject declares "an 'interest' by way of a 'wild' rather than theoretically grounded practice" (174). But I do not think that this implies that there is no relation between theory and practice, only that the relation must be heterogenous recalcitrance, which is the recalcitrance of the context we have laboriously and so incompletely reconstructed.

"O For a Muse of Fire, that would ascend / The brightest Heaven of Invention" (69a; Riverside, Prologue 1-2). We begin with a literary-dramatic-rhetorical convention, on behalf of the author (function), an invocation of the Muse, of powers of Invention, and thereby an invocation of the
eous and contradictory. That is the law of genre.

What are the relations between adaptation and the author? What can adaptation do, if anything, with the author? The author is a particular manifestation, in legal, literary, and cultural apparatuses, of the subject, and therefore it is necessary to have some understanding of the subject in order to understand the author.

Theoretical model which places originality and free recreation on one side and— to its detriment—adaptation on the other. This is bound to lead to naiveties and confusions—as in Rabkin's rejection of "authorial intent" (145) on the one hand and on the other his admonition not to "falsify the aesthetic" (145), or his assertion that what Miller read as a parody of his work

powers of the author-dramatist-rhetor. This is followed in the next few lines by a shift to theatrical questions, questions of performance and theatrical representation which invoke a different, more inclusive vision of the dramatic-theatrical enterprise: "A Kingdome for a Stage, Princes to Act, / And Monarchs to behold the swelling Scene." Players and audience jostle with author. Speaking of and (be)for(e)
this heterogeneity is The Prologue, who is to be admitted as
This is not the place to discuss in any detail the long history of the critique of the subject. There are, however, several aspects of this critique which are important. One project, in the critique of the subject from Marx to Derrida, is the unravelling of a certain illusion of the subject, as a metaphysical or psychological plenitude, a self-knowledge, an independence of "was manifestly an homage" (144), as if Miller's interpretation could be simply wrong.

Part of the problem here may arise from Rabkin's assertion that "Anything we can read as a coherent ensemble of messages constitutes a text" (151). I would argue that a naive faith in coherence is what limits our understanding of the complex and contradictory interplays between originality, other-

Chorus. The Chorus speaks sometimes as we, sometimes as I [not unlike the I/we I have adopted in this column: the critic as chorus]—as if in the space between popular community and nascent individualism, sometimes as a gathering/separating, sometimes as a unifying voice, in various positions of inclusion and exclusion, variously as the Subject with a capital S. This Subject speaks not from a place of its own, but at the intersection of heterogeneous
will. The subjective consciousness, for Marx, is a social product (German Ideology, 19). For Derrida the subject comes to be seen as a (necessary) fiction, an absolutely indispensable function ("Discussion," 271) of our (metaphysical) way of thinking. Althusser, on the other hand, specifies the function of the subject as the perpetuation of imaginary relations, or ness, and adaptation in any theatrical (re)interpretation. Such a naive sense of coherence is what is wrong with our Figure 2. As a circle it implies unity, coherence, foreclosure, in a way that the complex dynamics of theatre in history undermine. We need here, or at least lack here, a Figure 3, a figure perhaps based on catastrophe theory, a model of an indeterminate number of dimensions, full of cusps and

subjects: everyone as no one, no one as everyone, everyman. What I want to explore is the complexity of this I/we, how it works and plays, how it represents, both exposes and obscures, the heterogeneity of those gathered in the playhouse, how, in the king's words, "We must beare all."

[Note how I have slipped--following literary convention--from the past tense to the present, now that I'm writing about 'text' and not 'context.' This is part of the
ideology, for the sake of the perpetuation of the powers in dominance. The subject, then, is exposed as not only the site of illusion, but as "subJECTED"—in a famous phrase of Marx, as merely the "bearer" of economic, political, or cultural relations. Recently Paul Smith has criticized such critiques of the subject as leaving, in their reduction of our singular histories of discursive structure of the author function: 'Shakespeare, our contemporary.'

We have already noted how the Chorus speaks in the first four lines both for the author and for the players, which, given what we know of the author function in Renaissance theatre companies, is what we might have expected. We also know that the company was divided into sharers and hired men. Is this division at play? Not overtly, it would
to a monolithic and incapacitating illusion, no space for human agency. Whether or not such criticism is fair or adequate, Smith at least reminds us that the subject is not monolithic but heterogeneous, and argues that the heterogeneity of the subject, as a space of contradictory subjections, is a more promising site for contestatory activity than a simple theory of our Night's Dream, the beginning of a mapping of the heterogeneous play of adaptation in all its dimensions. This beginning is not a reconstruction, not even a verbal one. It is not a treatment of all the main issues, not even of all the main issues that are relevant to this study: for instance, the quality and reliability of the material on which a reconstruction might be based (Selbourne, xxi-xxii; Loney, seem, as it is in, say, "The Induction on the Stage" to Jonson's Bartholomew Fair, with its hierarchy of author, spectators, book-keeper, and stage-keeper, a hierarchy as much ideological (structured by the rising hegemony of the author function) as 'real.' In Henry V there is first a general rhetorical debasement of all members of the theatrical company: "flat vnraysed Spirits," and in the Epilogue, "Our bending Author" (95b; Epilogue 2). The theatre company
subjection would allow.

The critique of the author as the illusion of creative and independent genius has been carried out on many fronts. Roland Barthes does much of this work in "The Death of the Author." The author is not a timeless but a historical figure, a product of the individualism of the Reformation (143). Likewise, the history of the author, according to Barthes, is a company of servants. This debasement has to do with the stratifications of representation and the debasement of theatrical representation in the face of the representations of monarchical power—which we shall return to—and within that problematic the specifics of commoners playing the roles of kings and nobles. We might note here that actors seem to have slipped through a loophole in the sumptuary laws: they bought for their costumes the wardrobes of 11, 53), or the necessary limits of the various possibilities of reconstruction as a theatrical or scholarly activity (Loney, 12, 71, 4a), or the politics of Brook's position and production (Selbourne, 27- 29; Brook 1968, 84-85; Brook 1987, 99). All I can do here is pose questions concerning the definitions of three terms which come into play when Peter Brook's Midsummer Night's Dream is considered.
Compagnon, is circumscribed by the history of the modern book (11), and so the author is the product of the cultural apparatus, in Foucault's sense, to which the modern book belongs. Ben Jonson, with the publication of his collected works, is a key figure for us in the inauguration of himself as author, and with the impetus thus given for the first folio of Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream, and what is Peter Brook's A Midsummer Night's Dream? Let us begin with the question of the original that one is (un)faithful to. How is this original to be vis-à-vis the process of theatrical adaptation. The three questions I want to pose are what is the original to which one [?] can be (un)faithful, what is Peter Brook's A Midsummer Night's Dream, and what is Peter Brook in the phrase, "Peter Brook's A Midsummer Night's Dream?"

deceased nobles which had been left to servants who were not allowed to wear such clothing (Orgel, 5). The only overt representation of the stratification of the theatre company itself is in the Chorus to Act 3 (Riverside, Act 4): "we," that is the company as a whole, "shall much disgrace, / With four or five most vile and ragged foyles," that is hired men serving as extras, "(Right ill dispos'd, in brawle ridiculous) / The Name of Agincourt" (83a-b; 4.Chorus. 49-
and his dedicatory poem therein to "The AUTHOR," in the transformation of Shakespeare from bending author, or theatre worker, to Major Author. Rabkin traces the interdependent development of the author, copyright law, and bourgeois property rights (152-154) (an interdependence also noted by Margaret Rose in the history of parody [180-182]). Much of his argument is based on conceived? Is the original merely the words of the text? If this is the case, then Brook's Midsummer Night's Dream, at least by Cohn's criteria, hardly qualifies as an adaptation. Brook believes that A Midsummer Night's Dream, like King Lear, or Coriolanus, is a masterpiece (Brook 1987, 87), an "absolutely perfect play" (Berry, 128) which can only be reduced by textual amendment. He felt no need

52). Outside of this one instance, the Chorus takes a decidedly unified view of the theatrical company itself ("Our bending Author," "our Play," "our imperfections"). It is in other aspects of heterogeneity that we can see more fully the play/struggle of unification and stratification. Relations between the theatre company and the audience are characterized by both a we/you discourse which separates: "your imaginarie Forces," "your humble patience,"
Barthes and on Foucault's "What is an Author?" For
dFoucault the author is not a person but a function:
"he [sic] is a certain functional principle by
which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses" (159): "Shake-
speare" is, therefore, not only the name of a histori-
cal subject who wrote plays, but rather the name of a network of cultural apparatuses. Like Barthes, to change a word. David Selbourne, who watched the rehearsals for the 'original' Stratford production, noted this "fidelity to the text-as-written" (19), that the text was "inviolable," that there was "no question...of additions or subtractions, cuts or alterations to the writ of Shakespeare" (65).

What becomes apparent, however, is that merely repeating the proper words does not guarantee a fidelity "your thoughts" versus "our imperfections," "our Kings," "our Play," and a shifting "we" which ambiguously unites.

For instance, "our Kings" may mean either the company's feigned kings or the real kings being shoddily represented by the players--that is, our, everybody's, kings. "Our" is used in this second way in the Chorus to Act 5: "Were now the Generall of our gracious Empresse" (91b; 5.Chorus.30). The we in "may we cramme / Within this Woodden O, the very
Foucault argues that the author-function is part of the history of bourgeois individuation in all its stages (141) and is now in the process of disappearing (143). For Barthes the death of the author is accompanied by the birth of the reader (1977, 148). But this reader, unlike (the) historical, intertextual subject(s), is without history, biography, psycho-

to the 'original meaning.' Selbourne becomes bemused that Brook attributes to the words of the text "near-unfathomable depths" (65); he complains that Brook makes more of Shakespeare's text than is there (79), that Brook tries "to induce responses which the text does not yield" (93), that Brook continually misreads the text (137, 181, 219, 229), ultimately, that Brook shows a reverence for the written

*Caskes* is ambiguous for another reason: it is the agent of a hypothetical act impossible to assign to any particular and actual segment of those present.

Perhaps the greatest ambiguity hangs upon the our in "our Play." We have seen that the theatre as spectacle, with a passive audience, has begun to take place in the Renaissance, and in this sense "our" as designating the company's ownership of the theatrical production apart from
logy; he is simply coupled with a rejection of the writer (67). For Selbourne, fidelity to the words of the text is not enough; there must be fidelity to the sense of those words, and that sense is to be determined by authorial intention. He speaks of "the playwright's truth in the last instance" (13), of "Shakespeare who conceived the whole in his imagination" (17), of truth "contained only in the mind of the community at large would seem definitive enough. But it isn't played out nearly so simply. When has a passive audience been so implored to work? "Suppose...Peece...divide...make...Thinke...deck...Carry...Admit," they are asked, and elsewhere, "Worke, worke your Thoughts" (77b; 3. Chorus.25). Are these the men in England who do no work today? Later the Chorus will more concisely conflate the players' work and the audience's: "Now we beare the King /
there is a contradiction between the grounding of any ideology or practice in concrete historical subjects and the replacing of the author by a reader without history, biography, or psychology. De Lauretis, charging that Althusser is blind to gender (6), argues that we must replace Althusser's monolithic Subject with a notion of subjects heterogeneously constituted by gender, race of Shakespeare" (21); he identifies with 'the author' (41) and wonders what Shakespeare would think "if he rose from his tomb down the lane" (65).

For Brook, however, Shakespeare is taken to be quite a different phenomenon, or set of phenomena. On the one hand Shakespeare is what has traditionally come to be associated with the name, a code word in each country for a set of values and expecta-

Toward Callicle: Graunt him there; there seen, / Heauve him away vpon your winged thoughts, / Athwart the Sea" (91a; 5.Chorus.6-9). How would these lines mean differently in the public theatre and at court? Would they, in the public theatre, be the sign of a residual collectivity, of a communal theatre? Would they, at court, be a begging of favour for a play which breaks the aristocratic norms of unity of time and place espoused by, for instance, Philip
and class (2)—so as to distinguish not only the differences between subjects but the differences between what Foucault calls "subindividu- duals" (Foucault 1980, 208); and Spivak in turn, arguing that a persistent critique of ideology is forever incomplete, argues for a heterogeneous concept of ideology (118): the subject is irretrievably plural (122), ever in

tions (Berry, 124). In Brook's England Shakespeare is the linchpin of the 19th century Victorian tradition which comes down to him as "the deadly theatre" (Brook 1968, 10), with its admoni-
tion to "Play what is written" (12). But this 19th century fidelity to the text is a bore (Brook 1987, 71), and gives rise in Brook only to the desire to "fuck Shakespeare" (Berry, 123).

But this Victorian bore is Sidney (65-66)? Or is the text that pliable? Does it so easily discard half of its meaning, or would, say, the popular haunt the text at court?

Let us now consider the first phrase of address the Chorus uses to the audience: "But pardon, Gentles all." When we go to the Royal Alex in 1987 and the Chorus calls us gentles all, it plays to our sense of ourselves as, especially on such an evening, in our suits and ties and evening
actualization. As de Lauretis writes, "For the chain of meaning comes to a halt, however temporarily, by anchoring itself to somebody, to some body, an individual subject" (41)—or rather, the play of meaning is always played out, channeled through, singular and collective histories. Foucault argues that rather than merely calling into question the character and founding role not the real Shakespeare. The real Shakespeare isn't a bore. He is not a Victorian. He is an Elizabethan, and Elizabethan England was almost totally different from Victorian England (Brook 1987, 45). Elizabethan England was harsh, "the violence, the passion, and the excitement of the stinking crowds, the feuds, the intrigues" (Brook 1987, 71). Elizabethan England is like Eastern Europe in our dresses, ladies and gentlemen, but ladies and gentlemen of a decidedly bourgeois ilk. But how did this sound in the Curtain or the Globe, or, following Smith and Jones, in a performance at court?

At court, where the audience truly was gentles all, the phrase could be taken as no more than a necessary, expected deference on the part of the company spokesman before betters. In the public playhouse, as we have seen, not all
of the subject,
one must return to this question, not in order to re-establish the theme of an originating subject, but to grasp the subject's points of insertion, modes of functioning, and system of dependencies. (158)

Although Foucault foresees a world in which the author-function will own day (45, 125), and so the real Shakespeare, as Jan Kott says, is our contemporary (9). Rather, to be more precise, we are a strange cross of the Victorian and the Elizabethan (45), and while the Shakespeare of Timon of Athens is our contemporary, the Shakespeare of Othello is not (9).

Ultimately, Brook is not really interested in Shakespeare the author, any more than he is ultimately

were gentles, and this was eminently manifest. There the phrase would mean something else again. It is a lie. Is it a utopian lie, a theatrical dissembling in which the audience can play and represent a class it has no real access to, or an appropriation of popular identities by a hegemonic aristocratic ideology, or flattery eliding the stratification that arises everywhere else? For the nonce we cannot decide.
disappear (160), he sees it replaced by another "system of constraint." He also argues that the author-function does not remain constant in history, in as much as "The modes of circulation, valorization, attribution, and appropriation of discourses vary with each culture and are modified within each" (158). In light of this variability, I want to look, rather than at the interested in Shakespeare's words: "what passed through this man called Shakespeare...is quite different from any other author's work"; "it's something which actually resembles reality"; "it is the thing itself" (Berry, 115). Shakespeare is a "creator," and his words are a set of codes for "vibrations and impulses" (130). Shakespeare is the "miracle of Shakespeare" (Brook 1987, 16), and it is

Stratification arises everywhere else, subtly, for instance in the Chorus to act 5: when a distinction is made between those who have and have not read the story (91a; 5.Chorus.1-6), which in the Renaissance would be more obviously than now connected to matters of literacy and class (few women in any class could read (Gurr, 55)); but especially as the audience is made to see itself in the society represented within the "Historie," for instance in
death of the author, at the possible refunctioning of the author, a refunctioning which is at work in the practice of adaptation.

In translation, parody, citation, adaptation, rather than the rejection of the author function, there is an attempt to reinscribe it otherwise. According to Lefevere, in all forms of rewriting the author is decentered, and enters into play with not his method which interests us, it is "the Shakespearean ambition" (55).

Brook, then, is not trying to be faithful to Shakespeare or Shakespeare's words, but to something he takes to be more originary:
The text is not the play. Only a small part. Words change or say different things in another time and place.
The director has to go beneath them and find the London that "doth powre out her Citizens," like the Senators of Rome "With the Plebeians swarming at their heeles" to welcome the king, as these citizens in the audience "would the peacefull Citie quit" to welcome Essex (??) (91b; 5.Chorus.24-34), or in "those men in England, / That doe no worke to day" (86b; 4.3. 17-18)—as if the play were subtly prodding the audience, as if "Gentles all" was something they were to work out of their baseness towards—
rewriters (220); Graham writes that in translation, "The author is no less beholden to the translator than the translator to the author" (27); for Margaret Rose the parodist is both author and reader (69); Rabkin traces the plural "authorship" of the theatrical performance: from author to director to performer to audience and critics (155-159). If Spivak, de Lauretis, and the author's true intent. (qtd. in Loney, 13) The author's intent, behind the words, is to recreate processes and rhythms of thought, preverbal impulses (Selbourne, 39), "the life behind the text" (217), in the case of A Midsummer Night's Dream, to recreate magic (Loney, 25). Shakespeare's "mots rayonnants" (Berry, 121) play a part in this recreation, but "all the like the followers of Harry, promised "Crownes Imperiall, Crownes and Coronets" (72b; 2. Chorus.10-11)—although there are still differences of rank inferred between crowns and coronets—and in the "meane and gentle all" that receive "A little touch of Harry in the Night" (83a; 4. Chorus.45-47).

The king resorts to similar exhortations to and promises of noble equality, for instance before the walls of Harfleur: "On, on, you Noblish English / ...For there is none
Smith replace Althusser's Subject with a capital S by plural subjects in history, rewriting replaces the Author with a capital A, the central, controlling, independent, masculine genius, by authors as interdependent subjects, elements of a collective and overdetermined historico-cultural agency.

"Let's swear to resist fate; to be the authors of our own destinies" (85), printed word can tell us is what was written on paper, not how it was once brought to life" (Brook 1968, 12). Sometimes the words are only approximations (Selbourne, 101); sometimes they interfere with feeling (99).

Selbourne quotes Hazlitt who said that all that is finest in A Midsummer Night's Dream is lost in the representation (37); Brook, on the other hand, says that "the only way to find the true

of you so meane and base, / That hath not Noble luster in your eyes" (77b; 3.1.17-30), or before the battle of Agincourt: "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers: / For he to day that sheds his blood with me, / Shall be my brother: be he ne're so vile, / This day shall gentle his Condition" (87a; 4.3.60-63). Whatever this promise is worth to lower class men, it is not made to lower class women.

Yet in the face of such promises, stratification arises
says the heroine of Ann-Marie MacDonald's *Goodnight Desdemona*. Authorship can be empowering. When de Lauretis quotes Chantal Ackermann on *Jeanne Dielman* (132) or Lizzie Borden on *Born in Flames* (140-141), she is authorizing their power as cultural agents, their power to rewrite and to act, even if they must act and write "at once inside and outside" the path to the speaking of a word is through a process that parallels the original creative one" (Brook 1968, 13). This will yield to us the "secret play" that can only be discovered in rehearsals (Loney, 54). Yet Brook is just as dismissive of reconstruction as he is of the deadly theatre: reconstruction is guess work (Brook 1968, 13) and only of antiquarian interest (16).

everywhere else. It is worst among the French, perhaps to partly veil or mitigate it among the English: at the moment of defeat, even in death, the foremost concern of the French is to "sort our Nobles from our common men. / For many of our Princes (woe the while) / Lye drown'd and soak'd in mercenary blood: / So do our vulgar drench their peasant limbes / In blood of Princes" (89a; 4.7.74-78). No English noble finds anything worth objecting to in this speech, and Henry, in the face of English dead, makes a like stratifica-
dominant ideology (ix). They are bending authors: bending under the weight of culture; bending that culture in new directions.

In literary, dramatic, and other cultural spheres, the struggle for new directions is often fought over the issue of the canon. In his introduction to the issue of Critical Inquiry on the canon, Robert von Hallberg makes The only way to recreate Shakespeare's magic is by contemporary theatrical means. Somewhat xenophobically, Selbourne notes these 'alien' (29) tools whenever they arise: "metal plates and rods" (19); "imported" Japanese theatre (83); Chinese circus (85); Japanese wrestlers (109); Puck's stilts (109); Pacific island ritual (139); Grand Guignol and Kurasawa (175); "Grotows-

tion: "Edward the Duke of Yorke, the Earle of Suffolke, / Sir Richard Ketly, Dauy Gam Esquire; / None else of name: and of all other men, / But fiue and twentie" (91a; 4.8.103-106).

In the same way Henry resorts to a straight forward view of privilege in his wooing of Katherine: "O Kate, nice Customes cursie to great Kings" (94a; 5.2.268-269), although earlier in the same scene he calls himself a "plaine Souldier" (93b; 5.2.149).

Pistol and Williams in different ways recognize the
two major points: the first, that canons are political:

Interest in canons is surely part of a larger inquiry into the institutions of literary study and artistic production. "Politics," "economy," "social," "authority," "power" --these are some of the terms that recur kian effect" (297); "Oz not Arden" (323). We can note others: African ritual (Berry, 125) and music (Loney, 72); jazz or rock performance (72); Vedic chant (70); Persian folk plays (17); Indian theatre (56).

What we see, then, is a complex play of fidelity and infidelity: a fidelity to the words of the text is matched by an infidelity to Shake-speare's (interpreted)

limitations of the royal we when it tries to include and occlude the nonroyal. "Discusse vnto me," says Pistol to the dissembling king, "art thou Officer, or art thou base, common, and popular?" (83b; 4.1.37-38). Receiving a dissembling response, he dissembles in turn: he is "As good a Gentleman as the Emperor." Pistol knows the value of rank. When the king, in disguise, enters into discussion with Williams and Bates, he attempts to speak on the king's behalf, because "the King is but a man, as I am" (84a; 101).
throughout these essays: we are most curious now about those points where art seems less private than social... canons are recognized as the expression of social and political power;

(iii) the second, that the politics of canons are not simple: meaning; a fidelity to Shakespeare’s (alleged) ambition is matched by an infidelity to his (assumed) theatrical method. An ultimate fidelity to life and magic is not a fidelity to Shakespeare, but in sympathy with Shakespeare’s own fidelity to these concerns.

Our second question is what is Peter Brook’s Midsummer Night’s Dream? Here I want to limit the

Although the soldiers miss the duplicity in this line, they refuse to allow the discussion to entertain conjecture of a we which would include both themselves and the king, and the king is forced to debate without the use of such a we. Without it he must resort to anger, confrontation, and soliloquy, in which the separation of himself from the people is at its most acute, petulant, and self-serving: "Upon the King, let vs our Liues, our Soules, / Our Debts, our carefull Wiues, / Our Children, and our Sinnes, lay on the
The question raised...is not whether canons serve political functions but rather how fully their political functions account for their origins and limit their utility.

(iv-v)

To say that the politics of canons are not simple is in turn to say two things: canons are heterogeneous scope of the question. Let us set aside the complex social and theatrical materiality of the theatrical event. Let us say we could define and reconstruct all those elements that would go into a full account of a theatrical production: the text, the multiple borrowings from world theatre, the actors in all their specificity, their delivery and movement, costumes, makeup, the...

King: / We must beare all" (85a; 230-233). Here Henry slips from an "us" which designates the people, to a "we" which designates the king.

The Chorus does not address the women in the audience specifically as women, as does the Epilogue to As You Like It. There is no you or we which draws explicit attention to gender. When the Chorus speaks for the company, he only in the most marginal way speaks for any female boxholders the company might have included; when the Chorus speaks from or
apparatuses and call for a complex understanding of their workings; canons are not simply to be seen as monolithic apparatuses always at the service of the powers that be, but as battlegrounds where subversive effects might also be achieved.

The practices of rewriting that we have examined take up a complex and ambivalent relation to set design, the lighting, the auditorium, ticket prices, the exact composition of the audience and the specificity of each individual member, the socio-political organization of the theatre company, the entire mundus theatri—we would still be faced with the decision as to which particular performance we wished to reconstruct. Loney's acting edition is "an American adaptation, based point-by-

to the audience, the women in the audience remain unrecogn- nized as women. And yet the feminine is not absent from representation. I do not mean that some quality of an eternal or real feminine has somehow been captured by Shakespeare's poetic genius. I mean only that a range of quality not unknown or inaccessible to this masculinist theatre comes to be associated with (imaginary) women and the (imaginary) feminine.

What is the range of this representation of the
the canon, as they do to the questions of genre and the author: as Margaret Rose writes of parody, they are involved in the "dialectical refunctioning of the discourse of the canon of [their] time" (59). Canons are not simply prescribed books, or even prescribed texts in any narrow sense. There are also canonized authors and, through various refinements and simplifications which the production achieved in the Paris rehearsals for the tour and the later modifications introduced as the show travelled to such cities as Budapest, Helsinki, and Los Angeles" (3a). Is this teleological and progressiv-

feminine? I want to demarcate three aspects: the feminine as a scene of fate; women or the feminine as victim of masculine sexual violence; women as the privileged purveyors of translation, which will lead us to consider the role of the feminine in representation.

"O For a Muse of Fire." Can we read this as the invocation of an enabling power, for the dramatist the equivalent of the "Right and Title of the Female" (71a; 1.2.89) which supports the king's claims to France, or of
systems of exclusion and encouragement, canonized audiences and exegetes. Canons are also, as von Hallberg writes, "institutions of interpretation" (iii): they not only prescribe the material of culture and its agents, but the uses of that material. And so the canon can be refunctioned via any number of access points. Since the question of the author's notion of the theatrical production to lead us to believe that only those who saw the world tour version towards the end of its run were privy to the 'definitive' production? There are other ways of thinking about this.

Selbourne's book ends with the last dress rehearsal before the opening night of the first Stratford production. His is an account of giddy Fortune, "that Goddesse blind" (80b; 3.6.28), which takes down Bardolph? "As euer you come of women," says the Hostess (74a; 2.1.117), and in the play the feminine comes to represent the forces that control men's destinies, and places which encompass them. Women are "Deules incarnate" (75b; 2.3.31-32); England is a she (71b; 1.2.155); London "doth powre out her Citizens" (91b; 5.Chorus.24) and the cities of France "are all gyrdled with Maiden Walls" (94b; 5.2.321-322); we hear of the "Caues and Wombie Vaultages of
is implicated in any question of the canon, the reinscription of the author which takes place in translation, parody and adaptation has a pronounced effect on the relation of these practices to the canon. By reinscribing the author, whom Barthes (1977, 147) and Foucault (1979, 151) see as a control and limit on the possibilities of interpretation, these rehearsals. The production he talks about is not definitive, but constantly changing. To ignore the rehearsal process would be to ignore an essential aspect of the production. The specificity of Brook's rehearsal process is what sets his work apart from the deadly theatre:

In a living theatre, we would each day approach the rehearsal putting

France" (77a: 2.4.124) and "the foule Womb of Night" (83a: 4.Chorus.4); Peace is a woman with a lovely visage (92b: 5.2.34-38).

And what of "this Woodden O"? Any number of sources (Eagleton, William Shakespeare, 107n) tell us that O, nothing, can refer in Shakespeare to the female genitals. What if the theatre space too is a feminine site of fate? Fortune is the name of a theatre. Like Kristeva's chora, a potential space (Kristeva, 286), the space of the drives,
practices reinscribe yesterday's discoveries to the test, ready to believe that the true play has once again escaped us. But the Deadly Theatre approaches the classics from the viewpoint that somewhere, someone has found out and defined how the play should be done. (Brook 1968, 14) In rehearsal things don't stay the same; things are the drives of fate, the space of Freud's three caskets, of the feminine as the site for the male of birth, copulation, and death--three events spoken of in Henry V, but not (re)presented--the theatre, the theatre of the world, would take up its place--according to Baudrillard, its historically paradigmatic place--among the fatal feminine spaces. But Fortune is also a he, "with a Muffler afore his eyes" (80b; 3.6.31). The poet makes a most excellent description, for if the theatre is the space of the drives
group of texts. Few think of the author as a function, the name we give to what we interpret those texts to mean; fewer still think of Shakespeare as the name we give to a cultural network of which Shakespeare's texts are only one aspect. Secondly, despite all evidence to the contrary, the canon assumes that Shakespeare's texts, as he (without collabora-
erased (Selbourne, 279); those involved change from day to day and moment to moment (273). Rehearsals are performances in their own right (77), with their own strange logic: one day the actors "wreck the entire studio" (Loney, 28):

Anyone watching the play that morning would have found it unrecognizable and yet those of us who had partici-
of fate, it is also the space of the fate of the drives: it is a symbolic space, a chora contained by the patriarchal order, as if there has been "a complex process of ideation and transformation of the 'potential space,' after the 'mirror stage,' into a signifiable space of representation" (Kristeva, 286). The pre-subject comes to see himself in "the Mirror of all Christian Kings" (72b; 2.Chorus.6). Seen in this mirror, is the chora anything other than the masculine's myth of its own prehistory and its own struc-
tors) wrote them, have come down to us and remain immutable, even if commentary upon those fixed texts knows no inherent bounds. Thirdly, the activity of interpretation and exegesis of these fixed texts has become canonized, and all other activities—translation, adaptation, etc.—have been marginalized. Fourthly—although this is perhaps only true of the pated in the chaos sensed that we had been in contact with elements of the play that no amount of discussion or carefully plotted 'production' could have revealed. (58)

If rehearsals are performances, performances must retain the quality of rehearsals: "Creation and exploration need not and, in tures of disruption?

In the symbolic space, the patriarchal space, women are not the fate of men but victims of men: "pure Maydens fall into the hand / Of hot and forcing Violation" (79a; 3.3.20-21); the blind (like fate) and bloody soldier desires/defiles the locks of shrill-shriking daughters (34-35). The threat of violence slips repeatedly into sexual violence: "Pistols cocke is up" (73a; 2.1.52), and he is ready to "Couple a gorge" (2.1.71); soldiers are "Cullions" (78a;
study of Shakespeare in English departments--Shakespeare is the Author of dramatic texts, words on the page. The theatrical text, the complex (semiological) systems of the stage, culture, and society, are unnoticed and unimportant.

A reflection upon recent adaptations of Shakespeare calls into question these basic assumptions of canon-fact, must not stop on the last day of rehearsal" (Loney, 57); "theatre is always a self-destructive act and is always written on the wind" (Brook 1968, 15). The "endlessly moving, endlessly changing" nature of Shakespeare's material is best served by a production in which there is "no definitive moment of public realization" (Selbourne, xxvi). Every performance, like every 3.2.21); "let vs to France, like Horse [whores] -leeches my Boyes, to sucke, to sucke, the very blood to sucke" (75b-76a; 2.3.55-56).

Have I just taken a great license in reading these lines so obscenely? Since I want to take much greater license, I should attempt to justify myself before continuing. Firstly I invoke that wordplay, that popular inversion of aristocratic rhetoric that Weimann writes of, in which there is a mistaking of the words of the Church and the
formation. The adapter makes of the author function the site of collaboration and struggle, of overdetermined and complex historical agency. Sometimes certain lines take on a meaning only for the nonce (327); sometimes an accident happens which will never happen again: a black dog wanders across the stage (311); a tray of candles causes a fire (Loney, 35).

Shakespeare the major author becomes one agent among others. If adaptations of Shakespeare somehow reinforce Shakespeare's position in the canon, it is a different Shakespeare that is at rehearsal, produces "another truth" (Selbourne, 293). There are multiple possibilities in the so-called definitive prompt book itself: "Puck spins plate, ruling class (145). With the exception of Frankie Rubinstein, those who have studied the obscene in Shakespeare have done so within a system of decorum, of internal genrefication, in which some obscene turns of meaning are allowed--usually in comic scenes or scenes of so-called low life--and some excluded as clearly out of place. This would seem to be a blatant containment and disarming of the radicality and subversiveness which are the political motivation of popular inversion and transgression. My
work; and if Ann-Marie MacDonald or René-Daniel Dubois are allowed to have their names inscribed, whether in the theatre or on the syllabus, alongside or over the name of Shakespeare, the canon, like "Shakespeare," becomes something (politically) different than it was.

The concept of Shakespeare's works/texts, when forced to open onto the world tour, none are definitive, "but quite simply 'other'" (Selbourne, xxvii). We come now to our third point is that there is a scene in Henry V which enters into exactly this spirit of inversion and transgression.

Katherine asks an old Gentlewoman to translate the parts of the body from English into French. The scene is an elaborate set up, leading to the translation of "les pied & de robs" (79a; 3.4.50): "Le Foot Madame, & le Count." Foot sounds like foutre, the French word for fuck; count, a misprision of gown, sounds like con, or cunt. Two noblewo-
reworkings of his adapters, is exploded in a way that reading in the narrow sense, no matter how much license is given to it, can never effect. Shakespeare the major immutable text becomes a moment in ongoing adaptation.

The adapter, plagiarist and bowdlerizer, misreader and fellow of infinite cheek, arrives unwelcome and unrespected in the


Selbourne begins his book with the same opposition: "Will this be Brook's Dream, or Shakespeare's?" (7). But this closed opposition

men have been led, through the process of translation, to pronounce "*le mots de son mauvais corruptible grosse & impudique, & [n]on pours le Dames de Honeur d'vser*" (53-54).

I take these two characters as Muses of Fire, fire meaning both sexual ardour and venereal disease (Colman, 194), and I take this scene as my Right and Title of the Female to read obscene meaning where it is indecorous to do so. With this right and title, and with meanings culled from several handbooks on Shakespeare's obscene usages--
place of the canon, calling into question the limits of its exegetical activity, undermining the very original upon which that exegetical activity secures itself.

The adapter of Shakespeare opens the Shakespearean dramatic text onto the languages of contemporary theatre. Words run with and against a myriad of other 'languages,' between what we can see as the author function and the director function—which is just a variation on the author function—gives way in his account to a fuller understanding of theatrical agency: Brook runs up against the limitations of his actors, who possibly can only play conventional Shakespeare (215); after a certain point the play is in their hands, not Brook's (267); eventually although I apply these usages in passages where the writers of the handbooks have not always seen fit to do so—every line of the Prologue can be made to speak of rape or copulation (act, employment, force, work, carry, jump, horse, hour, play (Partridge), O, make, turn, supply (Colman) War (Rubinstein)), or sodomy (crooked, confin'd, hear(er), patience (Rubinstein)), or the anus (walls, little place, years (Rubinstein)), the vagina (O, piece (Partridge), (ac)-count (Colman)), the hymen (glass (Partridge)), the penis
languages which a canonical emphasis on the drama text most often elides. The adaptations of Bene or Blau are radically impoverished when their theatricality is sacrificed to a narrowly dramatic or literary analysis.

Like other ideological apparatuses, canons are used to regulate cultural and social production on behalf of entrenched the technicians take charge (319), and the setting, not the text, imposes a structure of feeling on the actors (321): "If the preverbal comes before the verbal, does place come before both of them?" (167); in performance the audience becomes the true master of the situation (299), and every audience is different: children are disillusioning (207-213); the Stratford audience conven-

(raised, sword (Partridge), cock (Colman), crouch, all, part (Rubinstein)), semen (spirits (Colman)), or sexual arousal (fire, pride, raised (Partridge)), or homoeroticism (heaven, like, man (Rubinstein)), or prostitution (hour, horse (Kökeritz), war (Rubinstein)), or pregnancy (swelling, great (Partridge)). I do not claim to be able, will not make an attempt, do not want, to put these meanings into linear sense, to propose an alternative rhetorical reading of the Prologue. These meanings transgress and disrupt that
interests. The question von Hallberg raises is whether "canons are only the instrument of en-
trenched interests" (iv) 
[emphasis added]: "However, whether new canons, expressing as yet unestab-
lished interests, ought now to be formed is an open question." "I teach," writes Spivak, "a small number of the holders of the can(n)on, male or tionalizes (285); the Los Angeles audience doesn't get it, while the students of San Francisco do (Loney, 76).

Finally, Loney's acting edition, with its long list of contributors, ends with three blank pages for "director's notes": new audiences await new 'Peter Brooks.'

Let us end with three citations:

Seeing a first public discursive linearity; they both subvert it and hint at a polymorphous, carnivalesque freedom of play, as well as expose the violent sexual underbelly of hegemonic rhetoric and patriarchal power.

The Prologue, the scene of representation, the Salic law, France, translation are sites where the struggle over interpretation, the struggle for power, take place. We are given (in somewhat corrupt form) the hegemonic position in these struggles: "As many I ynes [lines] close in the Dials
female, feminist or masculist, how to read their own texts, as best I can" (92). As a related practice of reinterpretation, adaptation has its own political effects upon prescribed canonical practice: if Othello, Romeo and Juliet, and Pericles are written over with the radical (in)fidelity of MacDonald and Dubois, property rights and performance of a play one has directed is a strange experience. Only a day before, one sat at a run-through and was completely convinced that a certain actor was playing well, that a certain scene was interesting, a movement graceful, a passage full of clear and necessary meaning. Now surrounded by an

center: / So may a thousand actions once a foote, / And [end] in one purpose" (72a; 1.2.210-212); or as the King says, "France being ours, wee'll bend it to our Awe, / Or breake it all to peeces" (224-225). In as much as "Our bending Author" collaborates in this project, we "may call the businesse of the Master the author of the Servants damnation" (84b; 4.1.153-154). But the King, no more than our bending author, can escape the scene of representation, and that scene is also a place of mangling (95a; Epilogue
copyrights, exegetical disciplines, questions of origin and scholarship have all been rearranged.

Adaptation, however, runs the risk of sophisticated (re)appropriation by entrenched interests. When Margaret Rose worries about the ambivalence of parody as a "norm" (188), the question is not just whether such a marginalized and heretofore minor audience part of oneself is responding like this audience, so it is oneself who is saying "I'm bored," "he's said that already," "if she moves once more in that affected way I'll go mad" and even "I don't understand what they're trying to say." (Brook 1968, 127-128)

4), of mockeries (83b; 4.Chorus.53)--like the enemy, the French--of translation, and misprision. Three identities would seem to be mutually exclusive: king, woman, player. The king is not a woman or a player; the woman is not a king or a player; the player is not a king or a woman. So speaks the hegemonic order. And yet the king is a woman, and her name is Elizabeth. Henry acts by right and title of the female. The king is a player too. As the Chorus speaks "Prologue-like," even should there be princes to act, "the
activity can function as a hegemonic apparatus, but also whether any normalization of such a practice will likely be an appropriation by the dominant cultural forces. Bruce Barber has shown how appropriation is a tool at the disposal of whomever is capable of using it. We have seen how the *Globe and Mail* has used parody to ridicule those who would be

But it would be necessary to analyze very closely the experience of hearing someone else read a text you have allegedly written or signed. All of a sudden someone puts a text right in front of you again in another context, with an intention that is both somewhat yours and not simply yours...It

*Warlike Harry,* would still only appear "*like himselfe.***" When our scene shifts to Southhampton, and "There is the Play-house now" (73a; 2.Chorus.36), it means either the playhouse now represents Southhampton, or Southhampton is now the playhouse, where the King stages his entrapment of the traitors, mangling by starts the full course of their glory.

The relations between "*Warlike Harry, like himselfe*" and the "*flat unraysed Spirits*" entail both an identification
'unfaithful' to Shakespeare, how Ruby Cohn is able to appropriate Shakespearean "offshoots" for traditional literary studies, while at the same time minimizing and ghettoizing them. As Andrew Dudley writes, it is not a question of the original versus adaptation, but of one method of adaptation against another (15).

can reconcile you with what you've done, make you love it or hate it. There are a thousand possibilities. Yet one thing is certain in all this diversity, and that is that it's never the same. (Derrida Ear of the Other, 157-158)

The 3X4 meter parts of the beam join together with spigots and

and a hierarchical differentiation, and these relations are somewhat contradictory. While "the inescapability of representation" always differs from "the metaphysical fantasy of pure presence" (Arac, xxiv), and therefore leaves that authoritative fantasy potentially vulnerable, a history of "the mechanics of representational power," that is, the complicity of representation and an authoritative imaginary presence, shows that representation is not the same across time (Arac, xxvi-xxvii), and is thus a scene of historical
These, then, are some of the possibilities and pitfalls for subversion and political action within the relations of adaptation to the canon. Of course, if adaptation at any conjunction takes up a position within or on the side of the canon, rather than merely as the exposure of the arbitrariness and motivatedness of canons and their apparatuses, it sockets. Each end of the beam is fitted with sockets, which drop over spigots, on tops of towers. Each of the 9-meter high towers comprise 4 parts, the top of one part entering the bottom of the part above, to provide registration. The parts are fixed together with socket head bolts engaging and ideological struggle. Even within a circumscribed ‘era’ there is heterogeneous contradiction within and struggle over the mechanics and power of representation.

Such is some of the complexity of the “Howre-glasse” (the our glass), the mirror of all Christian kings, the mirror/stage, the scene of representation, translation, adaptation, of mangling, of politics, where ‘we’ come into association, where our association(s) are cathected, negated, and recathected. The Renaissance theatre was first
cannot do so with the same certainty as have past metaphysicians of the canon. As we move a theory of adaptation into practice, into a strategy of political (re)positioning, whether in matters of genre, authorship, or the canon, we find ourselves somewhat aligned with Francis Bacon’s project in The Great Instauration: the business at hand is not an

with captive nuts on the part below and aligned by tapered pins in precision holes in each corner of each join [sic]. (Loney, 78)

This last is from an account of the set used in the world tour of Peter Brook’s Midsummer Night’s Dream. As part of the text which has accrued to Brook’s production, it adds words to

bent to the King’s awe, as much as it would bend, and then broken to pieces. It comes to us as an already shattered mirror, fragmentary and decontextualized. Like the Chorus, it is always beside itself, mangling itself, adapting itself, struggling with itself, not what it was. If this account has shown anything, it is that the original Henry V can never be reconstructed, at least not fully or disinterestedly, that in many ways there was no original to be reconstructed, only mockeries. But in continuing to mock,
opinion to be held, but Shakespeare which Shakespeare never intended, just as
work to be done. Brook's set is a set which Shakespeare never intended. We play with Shakespeare's text; we play with his intentions; we are in the realm of adaptation.

in mangling, in adapting, we take a certain acceptance of the (in)fidelity of our (in)fidelities, and we make of Henry V, "our Play." But there are many ours and many in an our. Has all this history then been only to negate history? Has all our reconstruction only been to deny the point of reconstruction? In part, yes. And that would be a useful enough exercise. But historical reconstruction can be useful, helping to inform our own reinterpretations. How so, I think it best to leave open.
Exergue/interlude

[This was written before the introduction and then rewritten [and rewritten] in the light of the writing [and of the rewriting] of that introduction: like Henry V—I am tempted to say like any text—it shows signs of incomplete revision.]

Before the question of the form of my introduction, there is the question of the explication of that form. This explication, this exergue, is outside the introduction, unfaithful to that introduction, a linear simplification, an intralingual translation of that introduction. In some ways it is like those popularizers of Derrida: Culler, Norris, LaCapra, who abandon, in abandoning the formal and rhetorical complexity of the 'original' (text and/or thought), some of the import and intention of the original. This explication is a bowdlerization of my introduction. It is a sellout to rational and academic thinking. It is written against the (anti)genre that my introduction has taken up. It is very masculine: phallic in form, where the introduction was triangular, deltic, feminine (or at least the feminine caricatured and stylized). [January 12, 1989: Ian Balfour has raised strong objection to the rigidity and essentialism of my use of the binary opposition masculine/feminine. I am a man; I write as a man. Elsewhere in this
dissertation I raise Teresa de Lauretis' objections to the use of 'the feminine' by male thinkers as a way of justifying their own work. I have chosen not to delete what I have written here: let it stand as a confession, and also as part of the problematic of any strategic use, by men or women, of the concepts of masculinity and femininity. This problematic arises at several moments in this dissertation: in my discussion of women in the audience of Shakespeare's Globe and the feminine as a conception (of the men at work) in Shakespeare's theatre; in my discussion of Bene and Deleuze's invocation of the obscene; in my (in)ability to bring feminine voices to bear in part three.

On the other hand it cannot be totally an exergue: in fact it is an interlude between part one and part two of my work. It is partly in part one and partly outside of it. As a translation of part one it is partly faithful, partly unfaithful—as Culler, Norris, and LaCapra are both faithful and unfaithful to Derrida. As a rewriting of the 'original' it displaces the 'original.' It is an adaptation.

But questions remain. Is this adaptation a sellout? Has it taken transformation, multiplicity, subversion, and stabilized, genrified, unified them at the behest of a traditional, repressive academic process? Has it taken the feminine, the antigender, and masculinized/genrified it? For now let it stand. But everyone is free to enter into
this adaptative struggle: don't read this if you don't think it best, or if you want you can rip the pages out or scribble over them until they seem totally transformed.

[January 12, 1989: by now this exergue has been transgressed by so much rewriting that it is tied to the rest of this work in many ways which make it less and less of an exergue, less and less in need of an apology, or more and more adequate as an apology for itself.]

There are three points to this explication: the layout of the pages is formally analogous to the structure of the deconstructive process that [partially] informs my introduction; the multiplicity of a discourse in three parts is more in keeping with the multiplicity of any discourse and any mind (subjectivity) at work, and therefore approaches more closely than traditional academic discourse to a 'true' plain style; the form of this discourse--three parts running concurrently--demands that a decision be made as to how any reading of this text will decide to perform the text, so that by foregrounding the performability of this text I foreground the inherent performability of any text, a performability which has been effaced and marginalized in traditional discourse, both academic and dramatic (though even there performability [reading as rewriting] is unavoidable), but which cannot and should not be effaced in the
theatrical text: this text, like a piece of theatre (ultimately like any text), must be performed to be read, and must be adapted to be performed.

Each of these three points needs elaboration and defending.

The layout of the pages is formally analogous to the structure of the deconstructive process. The deconstructive process structures its examination of a question into two complicitous opposing concepts, one of which is hegemonic, exclusionary, rigid (masculine?—is there more harm than good in this metaphorical/quasi-essentialist engenderification of discourse?), etc., and the other of which is marginalized, excluded, amorphous (feminine?), etc., and then finds that this binary opposition is founded upon a more 'originary' notion, which is in some way an expansion, a primordialization, of the marginalized concept of the binary opposition. The layout of my pages—
--imitates or reproduces or adapts this structure: a rigid, right-justified column beside a loose, unjustified column, resting on an unjustified text which runs under both. This layout makes no claims to being anything but an imitation, reproduction, (hysterical) translation, adaptation of deconstruction. In no way is it the real thing.

[Since its inception the look of the page has changed: at the suggestion of Samuel Danzig, both margins of the bottom text are now unjustified.]

The content of each column is arbitrary but not unmotivated. They could, for strategic reasons, be rear-ranged. As they stand, the rigid column on the left deals with definitions of adaptation: definitions which delimit, genrify, and foreclose adaptation, and which set adaptation apart from the 'original,' from 'Shakespeare.' I have put the concept of definition in this column because it seems to be the hegemonic way that literary and theatrical studies have dealt with adaptations (of Shakespeare). The loose column on the right deals with the adaptation at the heart of the 'original'; in literary and theatrical studies this has been a marginalized position. Running under these two columns is a text which maps out, theoretically, a system of affinities which runs across a set of marginalized literary/theatrical activities, affinities which transgress definitions and genres. This placement of material works toward
the displacement of genre, definition, and fidelity to the 'original' as adequate ways of understanding and engaging in the act of literary and theatrical adaptation.

At other times, other struggles and other strategies. I might have dealt with originality and authorship/authorial intention and Shakespeare as great white father in the rigid column, with adaptation, deauthorization, the adapter as son or daughter in the loose column, and with the feminine as the fictionalization of paternity and the subversion/support of the masculine along the bottom. [In part those relations are played out in part three of this dissertation.] I might have dealt with the dramatic text, which excludes and ignores so many aspects of the theatrical text, in the rigid column, with the theatrical text, the performance text, which is so multiplicitous and slippery, in the loose column, and with textuality in the large sense—as expounded upon by Derrida in "But beyond..." (167-168)—across the bottom. I might also have tried to displace the hegemony of theory over practice. And indeed I have attempted to effect all these displacements, but not all of them are addressed directly by the macro-formal arrangement of the introduction: other struggles, other strategies.

[As a move to deprivileging the contents of the columns, they are now set up to change places: they revolve counterclockwise, on page 66 and on page 143. Each argument
now occupies each column for some time.]

The multiplicity of a discourse in three parts is more in keeping with the multiplicity of any discourse and any mind (subjectivity) at work, and therefore approaches more closely than traditional academic discourse to a 'true' plain style. I can only defend this statement by disclaiming its aspects. Three parts is really only the most rudimentary multiplicity and is in keeping with the complexity of nobody's [Ian Balfour suggests "hardly anyone's"; I give him credit because I have a strong enough reputation for cynicism as it is.] thought. I would only claim that three parts are more multiplicitous than one, and that with this interlude and the two formally distinct parts that follow, my work runs in six parts, which is more multiplicitous than three. At any rate I only hint at real multiplicity: I have formalized, stylized, adapted it; this text is no more than a moment in a great cultural intertext; I am not true to that intertext. I am both faithful and unfaithful to it; to the degree that the form of this text indicates in this direction, it is more 'true' than a text which disguises multiplicity.

This text positions itself in a certain way to traditional academic discourse: it is an adaptation of the genre "Ph.D dissertation." As an adaptation it is both faithful and unfaithful. The sentence you are now reading, like many
others in this text, is not particularly unfaithful to the traditional plain style on which the academic style is based. The connections between ideas, the development of arguments, are not particularly unfaithful to that tradition. There is much linearity and rationality at work. Part of me is very rational and linear. Part of me would very much like to have this work accepted as fulfilling part of the requirements for the doctoral degree. This is [and is not?] a doctoral dissertation. On the other hand I have tried to subvert the genre I am working in. I want to do things that are marginal, unacceptable, indecorous, out of place. This is part of a struggle to transform and adapt the academic institution from a marxian, feminist position (I am neither a marxist nor a woman: obviously I have also adapted marxism and feminism). This struggle is analogous to that in my positioning on the margin of Shakespeare studies. There are similar analogies to the emphasis I put on the theatrical and nonverbal over the written or spoken word, and on the practice of adaptation over the criticism of it. All of these are attempts to break through the established limits of academic discourse.

Of course if the established limits of academic discourse were different, subversion might find itself in that moment speaking another truth. Terry Eagleton argues that in the face of late capitalist fragmentation of the
subject, residual individualist humanism can be a tool of revolutionary resistance (Against the Grain, 144-147). But I don't think that in the present situation academic discourse suffers from too much postmodern fragmentation.

[In "The time of a thesis: punctuations," the formal speech given at the beginning of his thesis defense, Derrida discusses the problematic relations between his work and especially the formal requirements of the thesis (42-44). In spite of longstanding reservations, he has decided, for reasons of "institutional politics" (49), to exercise the option of presenting already published works and to put himself forward as a doctoral candidate. My dissertation exists in the same space of compromise. Derrida realizes that some of his work--Glas, for instance--is so far outside the institutional norm, that he has not dared present it for consideration. I don't know if I haven't been somewhat more foolhardy with parts of this work.]

There is no ""true" plain style." Given that, I am not invoking the idea of a plain style which truthfully matches words to things, but a plain style which imitates the mind at work. If we accept what Voloshinov says, that the mind is words in context, and what Derrida says, that both words and context are text, cannot a particular text, this one for instance, attempt to be text, in the large sense, writ small, that is analogous--in all the inadequacy of the
analogy—to the reality of culture? But this is a far cry
from Shakespeare's "flat unrayed Spirits." Or is it?

The form of this discourse—three parts running concurrently—demands that a decision be made as to how any reading of this text will decide to perform the text, so that by foregrounding the performability of this text I foreground the inherent performability of any text, a performability which has been effaced and marginalized in traditional discourse, both academic and dramatic (though even there performability (reading as rewriting) is unavoidable), but which cannot and should not be effaced in the theatrical text: this text, like any piece of theatre (ultimately like any text), must be performed to be read, and must be adapted to be performed. On second thought, I have nothing to add to this for now.

[On third thought I add this: recently I was in The Squeeze Club with someone [Peter Kulchyski] who had just finished his dissertation. He was asked to summarize his thesis in one sentence; he did it. It was a long, complex sentence, but it was coherent and inclusive. I tried to fabricate such a sentence for my thesis. I couldn't. Maybe being in the middle of it I couldn't see the forest for the trees; maybe my thesis has no thesis. I think now that a thesis statement is a metathesis, an interpretation, something imposed on the text: any thesis statement is not
the thesis statement, but only the one decided upon. For now, this is the thesis statement I have decided upon: if any definition of theatrical adaptation is unacceptable, if the original and any attempt to reconstruct the original enter into the (in)fidelity of adaptation, if adaptation is best understood in relation to certain historically specific practices with which it shares affinities, then in studying the practices of some recent adaptations of Shakespeare in the light of these findings, we can come to some understanding of the possibilities in a specific instance of adaptation: The Winter's Tale in our [January 12, 1989: our?] own time.]

[January 12, 1989: In his thesis defense, Derrida writes, "What is the good of going where one knows that one is going and where one knows that one is destined to arrive?" (37) I do not reject the teleology which, on third thought, I laid out; however, it now seems to me that rather than always pointing to a yet-to-be adaptation, each part of this thesis is in some measure an adaptation in itself. This seems especially true of part three, which, while still longing for full theatrical practice, is not just the prolegomenon to an adaptation, but an adaptation-in-process.

Derrida also speaks of the impossibility of present-ing thetic statements (43). I take this to mean the im- possibility of presenting thetic statements which are
absolute, categorical, and wholly affirmative, which would dominate and inform all the text of a dissertation. It is impossible not to present thetic statements, but these statements cannot escape being haunted by the provisional, the interrogatory. Now I am almost out of the woods; I feel that my understanding of adaptation(s) is much more sophisticated, even much more clear, than it was on third thought. And yet I don't know if I am any closer to a 'true' thetic statement. I have used question marks to separate the sections of part three, my (in)conclusion: that is a gesture in acknowledgement of an understanding which remains in part without a thesis.]